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IMPACT PREEMPTION: A NEW THEORY OF FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT PREEMPTION 
Kristen M. Blankley* 
Abstract 
The United States Supreme Court has expanded its arbitration 
preemption jurisprudence to unprecedented and unexplained bounds, 
ultimately creating a new type of preemption, herein coined “impact 
preemption.” As applied by the Court, the scope of impact preemption is 
broader than even field preemption. The future policy implications of 
impact preemption are significant. Impact preemption shifts the balance of 
regulatory power in the dual federal–state arbitration system toward the 
federal courts and away from state regulatory authorities, contrary to the 
language and legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In 
addition, impact preemption has the potential to undermine the stability of 
the national arbitration system for consumers and contracting parties who 
utilize arbitration agreements in commerce.  
This Article traces the history of three fundamental flaws in prior 
Supreme Court rulings that ultimately resulted in the creation of impact 
preemption. First, the Court failed to define arbitration for approximately 
ninety years, and when it finally did so, the Court defined arbitration with a 
pro-business bias. Second, the Court failed to conduct a preemption 
analysis or to specify the type and scope of preemption it applied to 
arbitration. Third, as a result of the first two failures, the Court allowed the 
preemptive effect of the FAA to expand dramatically over time, 
notwithstanding its statutory language and legislative history, a failure that 
culminated in the creation of impact preemption. 
Impact preemption raises serious federalism issues because it does not 
require a conflict between federal and state law. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the Court’s impact preemption analysis may prohibit states 
from regulating any aspect of arbitration that potentially “impacts” the 
arbitration process. This Article urges the Supreme Court to return to the 
classic roots of conflict preemption analysis under the FAA. A return to 
these conflict preemption principles would restore the balance of 
regulatory power between the states and the federal government, and 
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would restore a measure of predictability for consumers and contracting 
parties who use the national arbitration system to conduct commerce.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last five years, the United States Supreme Court has broadened 
the scope of federal preemption power under the Federal Arbitration Act1 
(FAA) to unprecedented and unexplained bounds. This expansion of 
federal authority has a real and immediate impact on the lower federal 
courts, Congress, state lawmakers, and the business community. The 
Supreme Court’s new preemption jurisprudence, which this Article labels 
“impact preemption,” goes well beyond the boundaries of any other known 
type of preemption and implicates the federalism principles upon which all 
preemption doctrine is based. This Article explores the history of FAA 
interpretations, and the future implications of the Court’s new impact 
preemption jurisprudence in the arbitration context. This Article ultimately 
recommends that the Supreme Court should reverse its course and apply 
classic conflict preemption principles to FAA preemption.  
When Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, contemporary courts and 
commentators considered it a procedural law applicable in the federal 
courts.2 While the FAA applied in federal courts, states regulated 
arbitration within their own borders. With its 1984 decision in Southland 
Corp. v. Keating,3 the Court made a radical shift and ruled that the FAA 
was actually substantive law with preemptive power.4 This landmark ruling 
is peculiar both in its holding and in its reasoning. Academics have long 
debated the wisdom of the Court’s holding in Southland,5 and this Article 
does not revisit those old arguments. Instead, this Article exposes in 
Southland’s reasoning fundamental flaws that are directly responsible for 
the subsequent exponential growth in the FAA’s preemptive power.  
                                                                                                                     
 1. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)).   
 2. See David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public 
Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2013).   
 3. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).  
 4. See id. at 10–11.  
 5. The “correctness” of Southland has long been a subject for academic debate, and many 
scholars agree that it was wrongly decided. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians 
of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 129, 129–30 (2004); Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v. Keating Revisited: 
Twenty-Five Years in Which Direction?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 331, 332 (2010). 
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The Southland Court overlooked two critical questions: (1) what type of 
preemption should apply, and (2) what should the scope of that preemption 
be? This lazy jurisprudence led to the expansion of preemption doctrine in 
the arbitration context from traditional conflict preemption to today’s 
unprecedented “impact preemption,” which first emerged in the 2011 
landmark case of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.6 Although 
Concepcion claims to continue to apply conflict preemption principles,7 
upon closer analysis it becomes apparent that the Supreme Court has 
created a new form of preemption. The preemption applied in Concepcion 
strays from the plain language, the prior accepted meaning, and the 
purposes of the FAA. Ultimately, Concepcion not only expands 
preemption doctrine but it also promotes business interests at the expense 
of the consumer.  
Impact preemption differs fundamentally from any of the traditional 
categories of preemption—express preemption, field preemption, and 
conflict preemption. Impact preemption occurs without an express mandate 
from Congress, unlike express preemption.8 Impact preemption applies in 
an area with no pervasive regulatory scheme, unlike field preemption.9 
Finally, impact preemption does not require a conflict in text or purpose 
between federal and state regulation, unlike conflict preemption.10  
For reasons developed below, impact preemption is a dangerous 
expansion of federal power and it is particularly ill suited to the FAA. The 
Court appears to leave no room for state regulation of arbitration, even in 
areas traditionally reserved for the states, such as ethics, qualifications, and 
arbitration procedures. None of the literature to date has exposed this new 
type of preemption, and few articles have systematically considered the 
question of FAA preemption.11  
                                                                                                                     
 6. See 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 7. See id. at 1747.   
 8. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion); 
Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the Osh Act Does 
Not Preempt State Guns-at-Work Laws, 61 FLA. L. REV. 475, 483 (2009).  
 9. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible 
Solutions, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271 [hereinafter Cole, Federalization of Consumer Arbitration] 
(discussing the breadth of the FAA preemption and the resulting issues for state regulation of 
consumer arbitration); Horton, supra note 2, at 1218–23 (determining the role of state public policy 
in the wake of increasing federal authority and the proper scope of the FAA under a purposivism 
analysis). In addition, a handful of student works discuss the preemption analysis of the Concepcion 
case. See generally Kristopher Kleiner, Comment, AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion: The 
Disappearance of the Presumption Against Preemption in the Context of the FAA, 89 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 747 (2012); Shane Blank, Note, Concerning Preemption: Upholding Consent Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 281. These pieces, while good, are not sweeping 
statements of preemption in the area of arbitration because of the limited nature of student works.  
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This Article fills this scholarly void by examining the historical 
development and potential consequences of impact preemption. Part I 
presents a short primer on preemption law and the contours of the FAA. 
Part II uncovers the fundamental flaws in the Supreme Court’s prior FAA 
preemption jurisprudence that culminated in the creation of impact 
preemption. Part III discusses the origins and attributes of the new form of 
preemption the Court has created. Part IV analyzes the implications and 
potential consequences of impact preemption, focusing on federalism and 
contractual concerns. Part V concludes that the Supreme Court should end 
its experiment with impact preemption and return to classic conflict 
preemption analysis when determining the preemptive effect of the FAA.  
I.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION LAW AND THE FAA 
Under all preemption theories, state regulation must yield to the U.S. 
Constitution, as well as federal laws and regulations governing the same 
subject.12 The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause dictates preemption.13 
Preemption is also grounded in the principles of federalism.14 The 
                                                                                                                     
Of course, scholars have certainly written on the area of preemption generally and in other 
specific areas of the law, and this Article will build on that scholarship. Arbitration is not the only 
field with questionable preemption rulings. See, e.g., Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: 
Dividing the Local from the State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
321, 322 (2012) (discussing the preemption of city and other local laws); Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant 
Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
153, 153, 155 (2012) (regarding preemption in the area of immigration laws following Arizona’s 
attempts at self-policing immigration laws); Michael P. Moreland, Preemption as Inverse 
Negligence Per Se, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2013) (providing that, with respect to state 
tort claims, “a grand unified theory of preemption doctrine has been elusive, and preemption cases 
come to wildly unpredictable results”); Raymond Natter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd–Frank Act and 
National Bank Preemption: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 303–06 (2012) 
(discussing the preemptive effect of the Dodd–Frank Act in the wake of the mortgage crisis and the 
Great Recession); Kevin Wiggins, Medical Provider Claims: Standing, Assignments, and ERISA 
Preemption, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 861, 861 (2012) (discussing disparate preemption treatment 
for claims made by plan participants and medical providers). 
 12. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 108.  
 13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Gade, 505 U.S. at 108 (providing that the preemption 
doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause); Charles Franklin & Allison Reynolds, TSCA Reform 
and Preemption: A Walk on the Third Rail, 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2012, at 14 
(“Tension between federal and state powers is hardly a novel dynamic in American governance. 
Indeed, the U.S. Constitution not only foresaw the potential for clashes between federal and state 
policies, but incorporated specific provisions to address such situations.”); Moreland, supra note 
11, at 1253 (“Preemption is the apparently straightforward constitutional doctrine based in the 
Supremacy Clause that a state law that conflicts with federal law is without effect.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Natter & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 308 (“The foundation for the 
doctrine that federal law supersedes conflicting state law is found in the ‘Supremacy Clause’ of the 
U.S. Constitution.”).  
 14. See, e.g., Moreland, supra note 11, at 1285. Of course, the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution provides that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
5
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supremacy of federal law and the respect for state sovereignty are best 
viewed as two sides of the same coin because the states retain their police 
power unless and until Congress acts to displace it.15 Examining the FAA 
within the larger scheme of preemption raises the following question: What 
form of preemption should apply to the FAA? To answer this question, this 
Part examines the various forms of preemption along with the provisions 
of the FAA and the congressional intent behind those provisions.  
A.  Federal Preemption Doctrines 
Preemption jurisprudence recognizes both express and implied 
preemption.16 Express preemption occurs when a statute explicitly states 
that the law has preemptive effect.17 Statutes that do not contain an express 
provision still have implied preemptive power under the Supremacy 
Clause. The jurisprudential framework for implied preemption takes one of 
two forms: field preemption or conflict preemption. Field preemption 
occurs when Congress establishes a pervasive regulatory scheme, and the 
“volume and complexity of federal regulations demonstrate an implicit 
                                                                                                                     
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. X. 
 15. Preemption scholars note the tension between the supremacy concerns and the federalism 
concerns wrapped up in the preemption debate: “Preemption doctrine is plagued by both 
indeterminacy and incoherence. These problems likely reflect the inevitable tension in a federal 
system between the appeal of having one clearly applicable federal policy and a commitment to 
preserving state and local sovereign authority.” Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination, 111 MICH. L. REV. 647, 648 (2013) (footnote 
omitted). Professors Erin O’Hara O’Connor and Larry Ribstein also note that:  
The Court’s preemption decisions sometimes stress the benefits of state 
sovereignty and diversity while, at other times, the Court asserts a need to protect 
federal policy from the vagaries of different state policies. The justices’ rhetoric 
seems to vacillate between these two pillars of federalism depending on the 
individual circumstances of the case. 
Id. at 648–49 (footnote omitted). 
 16. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 654 (1995) (“Our past cases have recognized that the Supremacy Clause may entail pre-
emption of state law either by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal 
and state law.” (citation omitted)). 
 17. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and 
the Copyright Act are just two examples of statutes with express preemptive powers. See Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (“In this case, we address the scope of several 
provisions of ERISA that speak expressly to the question of pre-emption.”); Fin. Info., Inc. v. 
Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 510 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he Copyright Act, by express 
terms, preempts state actions with respect to rights ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within 
the general scope of copyright.’”). The contours of the preemption are generally determined by 
statute. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011); Wis. Pub. Intervenor 
v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604–05 (1991) (“[Congress’s] intent to supplant state authority in a 
particular field may be express in the terms of the statute.”).  
6
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congressional intent to displace state law” in a given area.18 When field 
preemption applies, states may not regulate within the field, even when 
state regulation would be consistent with or complementary to federal 
regulation.19 
Conflict preemption deserves additional attention. Two distinct lines of 
jurisprudence have developed with respect to conflict preemption, both of 
which try to discern the purposes of Congress.20 First is the “impossibility” 
doctrine, under which federal law preempts state law if it is “impossible for 
a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.”21 
Second is the “obstacle preemption” doctrine, under which federal law may 
preempt state law when the state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”22  
                                                                                                                     
 18. Natter & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 309. In addition, the courts must determine whether 
the statutory scheme “manifest[s] the intention to occupy the entire field” of the subject of the 
legislation, Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1266 (2012) (quoting Napier v. 
Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)), or intends to occupy a field “exclusively.” 
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). The exclusivity of field preemption would 
prohibit a state from even passing legislation that is consistent with the subject matter of the field. 
See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (providing that field preemption leaves “no room” for states to even 
supplement the pervasive scheme of federal regulation).  
 19. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (providing that field preemption is a variant of implied 
preemption “where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 115 (Souter, J., dissenting); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la 
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (“Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to 
supersede state law altogether may be inferred because ‘[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be 
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it,’ because ‘the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject,’ or because ‘the object sought to be obtained by federal law and the character of obligations 
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))); Brett Merritt, Note, Collaborative Regulation: Cooperation 
Between State and Federal Governments Is Key to Successful Immigration Reform, 66 OKLA. L. 
REV. 401, 411 (2014) (“Courts must determine that Congress intended to completely occupy the 
field, leaving no room for state supplementation; the federal interest is so dominant that it precludes 
any state laws on the same subject.” (footnote omitted)). 
 20. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 115 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court required that a “high 
threshold” be met for preemption to occur. Id. at 110 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment); see also Courtney Gaughan, Note, Some More Watters, Please: The 
Dodd–Frank Act’s New Preemption Standards Lighten Consumers’ Wallets, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1459, 
1464 (2011) (“As a check on federal preemption powers in the absence of clear congressional intent 
to override a state law, a high threshold must be met for these implied types of preemption to be 
applicable.”).  
 21. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013) (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 
79) (internal quotation marks omitted). The impossibility doctrine is known as a “demanding 
defense.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009).  
 22. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 747 (1981) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Crosby v. Nat’l 
7
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The Court also established presumptions to preserve the balance 
between the states and the federal government. If the states typically 
regulate an area, the Court presumes that Congress does not intend to 
displace state regulation,23 and vice versa in areas traditionally regulated by 
the federal government.24 Further, a “presumption against preemption” 
exists in areas that the states historically regulated.25 The presumption can 
only be rebutted if Congress shows a “clear and manifest purpose” to 
preempt the state law.26 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (same); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (“Since pre-emption claims 
turn on Congress’s intent, we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text 
of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in 
which it occurs.” (citations omitted)). 
 23. O’Connor & Ribstein, supra note 15, at 650 (“For example, the Court often presumes that 
Congress has not displaced state laws when it legislates in an area traditionally regulated by the 
states.”); see also California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (noting that parties 
seeking preemption must “overcome the presumption against finding pre-emption” in fields in 
which the states traditionally regulate); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654 (explaining that the Court should 
begin with the “starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law”); Decker, 
supra note 11, at 333 (noting that the “presumption against preemption” applies to local laws in 
addition to state laws); Natter & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 310 (“In general, the courts will apply 
a ‘presumption against preemption,’ especially in a field which the states have traditionally 
occupied.”). When Congress evidences an intent to share the scope of regulation with the states, 
conflict preemption is applied more narrowly given the “dual regulatory system.” Nw. Cent. 
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 514–15 (1989); see also Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1984–85 (2011) (finding the test for preemption more 
burdensome when Congress intends to allocate “authority between the Federal Government and the 
States”).  
 24. O’Connor & Ribstein, supra note 15, at 650; see ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100 
(“[W]hen Congress intends that federal law occupy a given field, state law in that field is pre-
empted.”); Natter & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 310 (noting that the presumption against 
preemption does not apply where an extensive federal statutory and regulatory regime exists).  
 25. O’Connor & Ribstein, supra note 15, at 650, 656; see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 485 (1996); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Richard A. Epstein, 
The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 463, 466 (2009) 
(“[T]he ‘presumption against preemption’ . . . means that all doubtful statutes should be construed 
in ways that do not block the imposition of additional sanctions at the state level.”). 
 26. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012); 
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565; City of Columbus v. 
Ours Garage and Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 
533 U.S. 525, 541–42 (2001); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485; Cal. Div. of Labor Standards 
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997); CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 (1991); 
Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985); Jones v. Rath 
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 
624, 633 (1973). 
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B.  The FAA 
Given these federal preemption doctrines, what form of preemption 
should apply to the FAA? The answer to this question requires a close 
examination of the text of the FAA, its legislative history, and the history 
of the states’ arbitration regulation. Through this examination it becomes 
apparent that Congress intended a dual system of arbitration regulation, 
and that FAA preemption should be limited to strict conflict preemption.  
1.  The Statutory Text 
An analysis of congressional preemptive intent begins with the statutory 
text.27 Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925 to reverse the 
“judicial hostility” toward arbitration.28 At that time, courts considered 
agreements to arbitrate unenforceable executory contracts.29 A party could 
shirk the duty to arbitrate by filing a lawsuit at any time prior to the 
issuance of an arbitrator’s award.30 Breaching an arbitration agreement 
resulted in nominal legal damages, and the courts deemed arbitration 
agreements as unenforceable.31 
Congress passed the FAA to make arbitration agreements specifically 
enforceable32—the “front end” of arbitration law. The FAA also ensures 
that arbitration awards are enforceable as court judgments33—the “back 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion); 
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1990); see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 
U.S. 202, 208 (1985) (“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978))).   
 28. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985); 
Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, 
Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 318, 320–21 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert 
C. Bordone eds., 2005) (noting judicial reluctance to strengthen the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements prior to passing the FAA). 
 29. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984–85 (2d Cir. 
1942) (describing the executory nature of agreements to arbitrate prior to the passage of the FAA). 
The legislative history of the FAA notes the hostility towards arbitration agreements in the Senate 
Report from the Judiciary Committee. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (“Further, the [arbitration] 
agreement was subject to revocation by either of the parties at any time before the award.”); IMRE 
SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 49 (2013) 
(noting that an agreement to arbitrate was revocable until the point that an arbitrator issued an 
award). 
 30. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2; Horton, supra note 2, at 1225–26 (describing 
Congress’s intent to reverse the “ouster” and “revocability” doctrines by passing the FAA).   
 31. Kulukundis Shipping, 126 F.2d at 984; see also STEPHEN K. HUBER & MAUREEN A. 
WESTON, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5, 8 (3d ed. 2010). 
 32. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1984). 
 33. Professor Ian R. Macneil, in his highly influential book American Arbitration Law, 
described “modern” arbitration statutes as those which make executory agreements to arbitrate 
enforceable and which contain limited grounds for judicial review. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION LAW 16 (1992). 
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end.” This relatively short statute accomplishes these twin goals34 and 
intentionally does little else.35 
i.  “Front End” Provisions 
The “front end” consists of the first four FAA provisions.36 Of these 
provisions, section 2 makes arbitration agreements specifically 
enforceable:  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.37 
Section 2 reverses the historical treatment of arbitration agreements as 
executory contracts and makes them specifically enforceable. The final 
clause, known as the “savings clause,” puts arbitration agreements on equal 
footing with all other contracts by recognizing that arbitration agreements 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See HUBER & WESTON, supra note 31, at 10. At least one commentator, Professor 
Macneil, described the FAA as “a comprehensive integrated modern arbitration law containing 
everything needed for a complete system of arbitration, other than the basic contract law necessarily 
underlying any such system.” MACNEIL, supra note 33, at 102 (footnote omitted). Professor Macneil 
claimed that the “comprehensive” and “integrated” nature of the statute supported his argument that 
the FAA only applied in the federal courts, and not the state courts. Id. He argued that because 
sections 3 and 4 contain specific jurisdictional limits, the rest of the statute must also be read with 
those jurisdictional limits. Id. at 106–07. 
 35. Professor Richard Reuben describes the FAA as being “remarkably simple on its face.” 
Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Activism: What if the Bellwether Cases Were Decided by 
a Truly Conservative Court?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 883, 886 (2012). In 1970, Congress passed 
provisions relating to the enforceability of international arbitration awards, which developed out of 
the New York Convention. Because this Article concerns domestic arbitration provisions and the 
enforceability of state law, Chapter 2 of the FAA is outside the scope of this Article. Also, in 1988, 
Congress added two provisions to the FAA, neither of which are relevant here. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 15–
16 (2012).  
 36. See Jack M. Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and 
Comprehensive Set of Statutory Default Legal Rules, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 227, 254–55 
(2011) (discussing the “front-end” issues of the FAA). Section 1 contains some definitions, 
including a definition of “commerce,” which is important for some of the early determinations on 
whether the FAA has preemptive power at all. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Although not part of this 
Article’s analysis, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court in 2001 interpreted the last phrase 
regarding employment contracts to only include contracts of employment in interstate travel types 
of occupations, similar to the enumerated categories of seamen and railroad employees. See Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). 
 37. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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are subject to the same rights and defenses of general contract law defined 
by the states.38  
Section 2 contains no language limiting its application exclusively to 
federal courts. Scholars have debated the meaning of this omission. The 
late Professor Ian Macneil, for example, in his influential book, American 
Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization, Internationalization, 
argues that a jurisdictional limitation should be read into section 2.39 To the 
contrary, Professor Christopher Drahozal argues that this silence indicates 
the opposite intent—that section 2 should have broader applicability than 
the sections without an express jurisdictional limit.40 As explained in more 
detail below, the Supreme Court has applied section 2 broadly, giving it 
preemptive effect over state law. 
This Article takes a limited view of section 2’s reach. It proposes that 
section 2 speaks only to the parties’ agreement to “settle by arbitration.”41 
As detailed below, section 2 does not discuss the conditions or terms under 
which parties may arbitrate, such as the number of arbitrators, applicable 
law, arbitrator qualifications, and applicable discovery. This Article treats 
the parties’ bare agreement to arbitrate separately from the terms and 
conditions that the parties apply to that arbitration. The idea of separating 
out agreements to arbitrate from other contract clauses, even within an 
arbitration agreement, has a great deal of support in other aspects of 
arbitration law, notably through the law of arbitrability.42  
This limited reading of section 2, however, may arguably conflict with 
section 4’s requirement to enforce agreements to arbitrate “in accordance 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2013) (defining the “saving[s] clause” as “a clause that explicitly declares that the 
federal statute is not meant to preempt certain state laws or remedies”). 
 39. See MACNEIL, supra note 33, at 105–06; see also Horton, supra note 2, at 1219 (“Most 
courts and commentators believe that Congress intended the statute to be a mere procedural rule for 
federal courts.”). 
 40. See Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative 
History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 124 (2002) [hereinafter 
Drahozal, Legislative History] (“As the above description of the FAA demonstrates, the language of 
the Act supports construing section 2 to apply more broadly than the rest of the Act. Section 2 alone 
by its terms applies to maritime transactions and transactions in interstate commerce, which could 
cover proceedings both in federal and state court.”).  
 41. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).   
 42. The law of arbitrability generally considers the question of whether parties actually agreed 
to arbitrate a dispute. See Rent-A-Center W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010). One 
common defense for parties who do not want to arbitrate is contract invalidity. Since the 1960s, the 
Supreme Court instructed lower courts to consider the agreement to arbitrate separate from the rest 
of the “container contract.” See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 
402–04 (1967). More recently, the Court instructed that an arbitrability clause in an arbitration 
agreement can be further separated from the remainder of the agreement to arbitrate. Rent-A-Center, 
130 S. Ct. at 2785.  
11
Blankley: Impact Preemption: A New Theory of Federal Arbitration Preemption
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
722 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
with the[ir] terms.”43 Below, this Article addresses how that language can 
be read in conjunction with a narrow reading. 
Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA contain the procedural mechanisms for 
enforcing agreements to arbitrate. Section 3 mandates that federal courts 
grant a stay of litigation in favor of arbitration.44 Section 4 gives federal 
courts the power to issue an order compelling arbitration45 upon a finding 
that an agreement to arbitrate exists.46 Sections 3 and 4 facially apply to 
federal courts, and the Supreme Court has not applied either of these 
sections to the state courts.47 In recent years, however, the Court has 
applied a small portion of section 4’s language to section 2.48 
When the Court gave the FAA preemptive power, it did something 
unique in all statutory law—it found that the FAA was a substantive law 
that did not bestow federal jurisdiction.49 Although scholars have used this 
anomaly to argue that the FAA should not be substantive law,50 the FAA’s 
                                                                                                                     
 43. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 44. Id. § 3.    
 45. Id. § 4 (requiring the parties to file a motion to request an order compelling arbitration). 
Under section 6 of the FAA, all applications to the court under the FAA must be presented as 
motions. Id. § 6. The federal court must have an independent ground for jurisdiction, such as 
diversity or federal question jurisdiction. See id. § 4 (specifying that the federal court would have 
jurisdiction “save for” the arbitration agreement). 
 46. Id. § 4 (2012) (“[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or 
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to 
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”). 
 47. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 
n.6 (1989).  
 48. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Court held that language in section 4 
regarding the “making of the agreement” can be applied to the states because while the cases 
originally interpreting this language rely on section 4, the underlying principles “arise[] out of § 2, 
the FAA’s substantive command that arbitration agreements be treated like all other contracts.” 546 
U.S. 440, 445, 447 (2006). In this way, the Supreme Court’s incorporation of sections 3 and 4 into 
section 2 of the FAA is similar to the way that the Supreme Court has incorporated most of the Bill 
of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 
 49. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9, 12, 15 n.9 (1984) (“While the [FAA] creates 
federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any 
independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) or otherwise.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581–82 (2008) (“As for 
jurisdiction over controversies touching arbitration, the Act does nothing, being ‘something of an 
anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction’ in bestowing no federal jurisdiction but rather 
requiring an independent jurisdictional basis.” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983))).  
 50. Horton, supra note 2, at 1227; David L. Franklin & Steven Greenberger, “An Edifice of 
Its Own Creation”: The Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Cases, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 
495, 499 (2012) (“At the very least, it would be odd—and the Supreme Court noted the oddity all 
the way back in 1984 in Southland—for Congress to oust state courts of jurisdiction over a wide 
range of cases without providing any substantive federal rule of decision and without creating 
federal question jurisdiction. But that’s what the Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to do.”). 
12
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strict jurisdictional limits show that the states have an important role to 
play in enforcing arbitration agreements and awards. 
ii.  “Back End” Provisions 
The FAA also makes arbitration awards enforceable, and three primary 
sections deal with these so-called “back end” issues. Under section 9, a 
federal district court “must” confirm an arbitration award unless it is 
vacated, modified, or corrected.51 A confirmed arbitration award has “the 
same force and effect” as a court judgment.52 
Sections 10 and 11 concern vacating and modifying an arbitration 
award. Under section 10, a federal court can vacate an arbitration award if 
certain conditions are met, such as fraud in the proceedings, arbitrators’ 
bias, procedural irregularity, or if the arbitrators exceed their contractual 
powers.53 These grounds are extraordinarily narrow, and courts do not 
vacate arbitration awards lightly.54 
The stringent review provisions serve Congress’s primary goal of 
enforcing agreements to arbitrate. Limited review holds parties to their 
bargain by enforcing rendered arbitral awards. Provided that the arbitration 
was free from procedural irregularities, the arbitral award will likely 
withstand review.55 
iii.  Other Provisions 
The FAA contains few provisions regarding the arbitration hearing 
itself. Section 5 gives courts the ability to appoint an arbitrator, if 
necessary.56 Section 7 gives arbitrators the ability to subpoena witnesses 
and compel the witnesses to bring evidence with them to the arbitral 
                                                                                                                     
 51. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). 
 52. Id. § 13. For instance, if a party could receive a judicial lien or a sheriff’s enforcement of 
a court order, then those remedies are available to a party with a confirmed arbitral award. Given 
the enforceability of a confirmed arbitral award, the statute requires that the non-moving party have 
notice of the confirmation proceedings. Id. § 12. 
 53. Id. § 10; see also Kristen M. Blankley, Lying, Stealing, and Cheating: The Role of 
Arbitrators as Ethics Enforcers, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 443, 459 & n.91, 460 (2014) (discussing 
the grounds for judicial review). 
 54. See Kristen M. Blankley, Advancements in Arbitral Immunity and Judicial Review of 
Arbitral Awards Create Ethical Loopholes in Arbitration, in JUSTICE, CONFLICT AND WELLBEING 
237, 270 (Brian H. Bornstein & Richard L. Wiener eds., 2014). 
 55. Two judicially created grounds for review, while still limited, do look at the merits of the 
award. Some courts will vacate an arbitral award when the arbitrator engages in a “manifest 
disregard of the law” or when the satisfaction of an award “contravenes public policy.” See id. at 
271. Issues regarding the viability of review outside of the FAA are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 56. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). Section 5 applies when the parties’ chosen method does not yield an 
arbitrator. Id.  
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hearing.57 Finally, section 8 contains some special provisions for certain 
admiralty claims.58  
The statutory text of the FAA becomes more intriguing when one 
considers what the Act does not cover. The FAA contains no guidance on 
how the proceeding should occur, the number of arbitrators, whether 
arbitrators must be impartial, the burden of proof, the availability of 
counsel, the ability to join actions together, whether the proceeding must 
be under oath, the availability of appellate arbitral review, due process 
requirements, or the like. Presumably, Congress’s silence endorses party 
flexibility59 and state regulation, especially considering the narrow scope of 
the text of section 2 and its limitation on the agreement to arbitrate.  
In addition, parties should be allowed to design a process to meet their 
needs depending on the complexity of the underlying dispute (subject to 
state regulation).60 This flexibility is consistent with the dual nature of 
regulation under the FAA because it gives states latitude to regulate 
arbitration and experiment within their borders.  
The FAA also does not dictate the details of what makes an agreement 
enforceable, leaving that issue for the states. Under the savings clause, an 
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable unless grounds exist “at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”61 Here, Congress explicitly 
incorporates state contract law into the federal scheme,62 thus further 
evidencing a dual system of regulation.  
Given Congress’s design—providing for both federal and state 
regulation of arbitration—the Supreme Court should proceed cautiously 
when determining the preemptive effect of the FAA. As explained in Part 
II below, the Court has expanded the scope of federal preemption under the 
FAA in contradiction to established principles of federalism and 
contractual rights. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Id. § 7. 
 58. Id. § 8. 
 59. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995).  
 60. See, e.g., id. (noting congressional history that enumerates many of the benefits that 
arbitration affords parties); Neal Troum, The Problem with Class Arbitration, 38 VT. L. REV. 419, 
419 (2013) (describing the FAA as allowing “freedom of parties to resolve their disputes outside of 
the court system” and generally in a “laissez-faire environment”).  
 61. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 62. See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 767, 772 (2012) (“A fundamental principle underlying the FAA is to respect freedom of 
contract. While the FAA may be regarded as federal pro-arbitration policy, Congress, through the 
FAA's savings clause, retained a role for states to hold arbitration contracts to the standards of 
generally applicable state contract law, including defenses applicable to any contract, such as fraud, 
duress, unconscionability, or contrariness to public policy.”).  
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2.  The Legislative History 
The legislative history is the next-best method of determining 
preemptive intent.63 The legislative history of the FAA is scant, at best.64 
The primary drafter of the bill was Julius Henry Cohen, general counsel for 
the New York Chamber of Commerce and a member of the American Bar 
Association Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law.65 
Cohen testified before Congress and wrote an influential brief reprinted in 
the hearing transcripts.66 The brief largely concerned the need to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate and the potential for conflict between the FAA and 
state regulation.67  
Most of the legislative history deals with the need for courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements. The report of the House Committee stated: 
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and 
the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party 
live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform 
his contract when it becomes disadvantageous to him. An 
arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other 
contracts, where it belongs.  
 The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our 
American law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of 
the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to 
enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that 
the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This 
jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle 
                                                                                                                     
 63. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606–07 (1991) (relying on an analysis 
of legislative history after determining that the language of the state was not clear as to preemption); 
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566–67 (2009) (relying on an analysis of legislative history). But 
see Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1980 (2011) (stating that relying on 
legislative history to determine preemptive effect is inappropriate where the state law “falls within 
the plain text” of the federal statute). 
 64. Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration 
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1314 (1985) (“Little emerges from the legislative history other than 
unhappiness with prior law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 65. Drahozal, Legislative History, supra note 40, at 130. 
 66. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the Subcomms. of the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 13–19, 33–41 (1924) (statement of and brief by 
Julius Henry Cohen). 
 67. See id. at 37 (“[W]hether or not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced is a question of 
the law of procedure and is determined by the law of the jurisdiction wherein the remedy is sought.” 
(emphasis added)); Horton, supra note 2, at 1259–60 (noting that the Cohen brief “suggests that 
although states would lose their ability to apply the ouster doctrine, they would otherwise retain 
their traditional authority over the validity of arbitration clauses”); Drahozal, Legislative History, 
supra note 40, at 131–33.  
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became firmly embedded in the English common law and was 
adopted with it by the American courts.68 
In a similar vein, Senator Thomas Walsh stated during a 1923 Senate 
hearing that the FAA “sought to ‘overcome the rule of equity, that equity 
will not specifically enforce an[y] arbitration agreement.’”69 This report 
addresses the heart of the FAA—the enforceability of agreements to 
arbitrate and a judicial remedy of specific performance.70 
The legislative history also suggests that the FAA should reach all 
agreements involving interstate commerce. Senator Thomas Sterling 
announced that “the purpose of the bill is that it shall not only extend to 
maritime transactions but also to transactions involving interstate 
commerce as well.”71 The business community backed the FAA and 
wanted to ensure that courts would enforce arbitration agreements as 
written.72 Business interests largely wanted to increase efficiency: “The 
desire to avoid the delay and expense of litigation persists. The desire 
grows with time and as delays and expenses increase. The settlement of 
disputes by arbitration appeals to big business and little business alike, to 
corporate interests as well as to individuals.”73 Supporters considered 
                                                                                                                     
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2. (1924) (emphasis added); see also MACNEIL, supra note 33, 
at 96 (quoting Alexander Rose of the Arbitration Society of America testifying before Congress: 
“We have a weakness in our system of arbitration. We need, and we must have the cooperation of 
the Federal Courts.”). 
 69. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (quoting Sales and Contracts to Sell in 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and 
S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 
Hearings] (alteration in original) (remarks of Sen. Walsh)).  
 70. See Drahozal, Legislative History, supra note 40, at 112. Professor Drahozal noted the 
reliance on this House Report in the Court’s Southland decision: 
Although [Chief Justice] Burger explained the reference no further, the point of 
the quotation is its suggestion that the FAA applies to contracts either “involving 
interstate commerce” or “which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal 
courts.” If the FAA did not apply in state court, the House Report presumably 
would have used “and” instead of “or.” By describing the coverage of the act in 
the alternative, the House Report suggests the possibility of contracts involving 
interstate commerce but not the subject of litigation in federal court—thus, 
necessarily, in state court. 
Id. 
 71. 66 CONG. REC. 2761 (1925) (Statement of Sen. Sterling). 
 72. See 66 CONG. REC. 3004 (1925) (Statement of Sen. Graham) (answering “Commercial” 
when questioned about whether the proponents of the bill were “legal societies” or “commercial”). 
The American Bar Association helped draft the legislation, which was sponsored by a “large 
number of trade bodies.” H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1; see also SZALAI, supra note 29, at 137–40 
(describing how Charles Bernheimer testified before Congress in 1923 regarding how the primary 
goal of the FAA would be to make agreements to arbitrate enforceable and to revamp the arbitration 
procedure and as to the types of typical business disputes being resolved by arbitration at the time). 
 73. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924). 
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arbitration to be a “great value,” allowing for the achievement of “practical 
justice” outside of the clogged judicial system.74 In addition, Charles N. 
Bernheimer, chair of the arbitration committee of the New York Chamber 
of Commerce stated: “The fundamental conception underlying the law is to 
make arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. The 
commercial bodies of the country have been urging the adoption of this 
principle of legislation throughout the country, and their point of view has 
now been accepted by the American Bar Association.”75  
 Scholars have debated how to interpret the legislative history. In 
particular, Professor MacNeil and Professor Drahozal have written books 
and lengthy articles on whether the legislative history supports a finding 
that the FAA is substantive federal law or merely a procedural law 
applicable only in federal courts.76 This Article, however, assumes what 
modern commenters take as “given”—that the FAA is substantive law 
applying in federal and state court—and focuses instead on the Supreme 
Court’s development of impact preemption jurisprudence. 
3.  State Authority in a Regulatory Vacuum 
Finally, traditional preemption doctrine considers the balance of state 
and federal regulation in the area at issue. Federal courts apply preemption 
more liberally in areas with broad federal regulation.77 Congress never 
created a regulatory authority to enforce or interpret the FAA, which reads 
like a procedural statute giving instructions on dealing with arbitration 
agreements. The scant provisions of the FAA and the lack of federal 
agency involvement strongly indicate that the Supreme Court should limit 
the FAA’s preemptive power.  
The “presumption against preemption” in areas traditionally regulated 
by the states78 should apply to the FAA. This presumption helps preserve 
the balance between the federal and state regulation. Arbitration is an area 
that states have traditionally regulated; however, the majority of Supreme 
Court decisions in this area have largely disregarded the historic role of the 
states, these presumptions, and the federalism concerns at issue here.79 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Id. Then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover wrote a letter to Senator Sterling 
championing the FAA. In his letter, Hoover expressed his concern that without the FAA, the courts 
would become clogged and unable to handle growing dockets. Letter from Herbert Hoover to Sen. 
Thomas Sterling (Jan. 31, 1923), in SZALAI, supra note 29, at 144–45.  
 75. 1923 Hearings, supra note 69, at 2 (statement of Charles Bernheimer); see also MACNEIL, 
supra note 33, at 88–89 (describing the testimony by Bernheimer).  
 76. See MACNEIL, supra note 33; Drahozal, Legislative History, supra note 40.  
 77. See, e.g., Christopher J. Kochevar, Note, Reforming Judicial Review of Bioequivalence 
Determinations, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2040, 2065–66 (2012). 
 78. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.  
 79. In the Southland case, two of the dissenting opinions noted the traditional role of the 
states in the area of arbitration. Justice Paul Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
cautioned the “exercise of State authority in a field traditionally occupied by State law will not be 
17
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States began passing laws enforcing arbitration agreements and awards 
even before Congress passed the FAA.80 In fact, Congress patterned the 
FAA after New York state law.81 The legislative history does not discuss 
displacing the many statutes already in effect at the time, but historical 
evidence suggests that a number of states had already passed legislation 
similar to the FAA.82 As noted above, the FAA worked in harmony with 
state arbitration legislation from 1925 until 1984, when the Court decided 
Southland.83 
At present day, all fifty states (plus the District of Columbia) have 
statutes enforcing agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards.84 Most of 
these statutes have deep roots. Although the 2000 Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act (RUAA) treads lightly because of the drafters’ preemption 
concerns,85 the states still have a role to play in regulating arbitration. 
States have been experimenting with so-called “second generation” laws 
regulating the arbitration process, even when they do not regulate the 
question of whether agreements to arbitrate are enforceable.86 These types 
                                                                                                                     
deemed pre-empted by a federal statute unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Similarly, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in dissent, noted that by 1925 “several 
major commercial states had passed state arbitration laws, but the federal courts refused to enforce 
those laws in diversity cases.” Id. at 34 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 80. HUBER & WESTON, supra note 31, at 8 (“Prior to the enactment of the FAA in 1925, 
arbitration was governed by state law and local practice . . . .”). 
 81. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (“The bill, while relating to maritime transactions and to 
contracts in interstate and foreign commerce, follows the lines of the New York arbitration law 
enacted in 1920, amended in 1921, and sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in . . . Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., rendered February 18, 1924.”); see also 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 279 (1995) (noting that the FAA’s 
supporters “urged Congress to model the Act after a New York statute that made enforceable a 
written arbitration provision in a written contract” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Drahozal, 
Legislative History, supra note 40, at 125 (acknowledging that the FAA was modeled after the New 
York arbitration statute); SZALAI, supra note 29, at 86 (noting that the New York Arbitration Act 
passed the New York legislature in 1920). 
 82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Southland, 465 U.S. at 34 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The drafters’ plan for maintaining reasonable harmony between state 
and federal practices was not to bludgeon states into compliance, but rather to adopt a uniform 
federal law, patterned after New York’s path-breaking state statute. . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 83. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 (recognizing Congress’s intent to foreclose attempts by 
state legislatures “to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements”); Dunham, supra note 5, 
at 332 (noting Southland’s departure from fifty-nine years of doctrine). 
 84. Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 596 (1997).  
 85. The drafters of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) questioned whether the 
RUAA it would be preempted by any provisions conflicting with the FAA and sought to carefully 
construct an act that would not run into a question on the area of preemption. UNIF. ARBITRATION 
ACT prefatory note (2000). 
 86. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 393–95, 
408 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, FAA Preemption] (noting that some questions remain unsettled as 
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of laws regulate a variety of issues, including arbitrator qualifications, 
arbitrator disclosures, ethics, and process requirements—hearing location, 
consolidation of arbitrations, notice, and the like. The states have 
historically regulated, and currently continue to regulate, arbitration to the 
extent they can. Given the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state 
governments regarding arbitration, states rightfully should continue 
regulating the area, despite recent challenges to state law on the basis of 
federal preemption.87  
The states have another important role in the regulation of arbitration. 
The FAA contemplates that state contract law will determine the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements. Under the savings clause in 
section 2,88 states retain an important role in determining the validity of 
arbitration agreements even under the FAA.  
4.  Conclusion: Conflict Preemption Should Apply 
The text of the FAA, its legislative history, the lack of federal 
regulatory authority, and the historical role of the states in the area of 
arbitration all indicate that the preemptive effect of the FAA should be 
analyzed under a theory of conflict preemption. In the late 1980s, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he FAA contains no express pre-
emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the 
entire field of arbitration.”89 Because Congress explicitly limited the 
substantive law of the FAA—section 2—to enforcing arbitration 
                                                                                                                     
to whether the states can regulate); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1200 (2011) (discussing the different “generations” of arbitration laws and 
state regulations); Cole, Federalization of Consumer Arbitration, supra note 11, at 285 (noting that 
laws regarding “discovery, consolidation of claims, and arbitrator immunity” fall within the class of 
“second generation” arbitration laws). One example of this next generation of arbitration laws is a 
statute that would prohibit a person from arbitrating outside of one’s home state. MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 27-5-323 (2014). 
 87. Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 86, at 408–09 (noting litigation issues generated 
by second generation arbitration laws). By its definition, the FAA is limited to regulating interstate 
commerce and maritime transactions. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). In addition, state law continues to 
play a role in arbitration agreements to the extent that the parties choose to be bound by state law. 
See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 484 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 88. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 89. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. Scholars, too, recognize that conflict preemption is the “correct” 
analysis for determining the balance of federal and state laws. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 2, at 
1226 (“Yet the FAA neither contains an express preemption clause nor sweeps far enough to ‘field’ 
preempt state law. Thus, the FAA can only trump state rules through the mechanism of obstacle 
preemption.” (footnote omitted)); Aragaki, supra note 86, at 1195 (noting that the current paradigm 
for considering the enforceability of state arbitration law turns on conflict preemption analysis and 
whether state laws are arbitration “enforcement neutral or enforcement impeding”). 
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agreements, federal courts should limit conflict preemption to state 
regulations that would make arbitration agreements unenforceable.90  
Limiting conflict preemption to such laws serves important policy goals 
regarding the appropriate authority of federal and state governments as 
well as the role that arbitration has in national commerce. The principles of 
federalism would be better served by applying a traditional, limited 
preemptive power to state arbitration laws. States, then, could continue 
experimenting with “second generation” arbitration laws, determining the 
best practices within a particular jurisdiction, especially in areas such as 
arbitrator qualifications and ethics.91 For the business community, a 
narrower federal role continues to support the freedom of contract and 
allows parties to know courts will enforce their contracts as written. 
However, the Supreme Court has expanded the preemptive reach of the 
FAA, jeopardizing these important policies and goals.  
II.  IMPACT PREEMPTION UNDER THE FAA 
To understand how the Supreme Court expanded the FAA’s preemption 
to the point of “impact preemption,” one must understand the three 
fundamental flaws in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. First, the Court 
has never defined “arbitration,” thus giving it latitude to engage in results-
oriented jurisprudence. Second, the Court has failed to engage in an 
analysis of the type and scope of FAA preemption, resulting in confusion 
regarding proper state authority. Third, as a result of these first two 
fundamental flaws, the Court, in Concepcion, expanded preemption 
doctrine to the point of “impact preemption,” which neither jurisprudential 
principles nor sound public policy support. Although the Concepcion Court 
claims to apply obstacle preemption, the Court actually creates a new type 
of preemption. 
A.  Fundamental Flaw I: Not Defining “Arbitration” 
“Arbitration” is an undefined term in the FAA. Congress chose to 
define “commerce” and “maritime transaction,”92 but not “arbitration.”93 
Parties regularly litigate the definition of “arbitration,” raising a host of 
questions about the characteristics that constitute arbitration and the body 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See Stephen J. Ware, “Opt-In” for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 263, 269 (1997) (“[I]f one can imagine an 
arbitration agreement that might be rendered unenforceable by the state law then that state law is 
almost sure to be preempted unless it falls into the ‘general contract law’ category . . . .”). 
 91. Montana is just one example of a state whose legislature has taken great care in crafting 
arbitration laws befitting the state’s particular needs. See infra Section IV.A for more examples of 
state statutes that meet the needs of individual jurisdictions. 
 92. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 93. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n, 218 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“Curiously, the FAA does not define ‘arbitration.’”).  
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of law the courts should consult to make that determination.94 The 
definition of arbitration has a large impact on preemption jurisprudence 
because the FAA is confined to enforcing a “provision . . . to settle [a 
dispute] by arbitration.”95 Defining arbitration is critical because state law, 
not the FAA, governs processes that fall outside of arbitration.96 
Given the weighty consequences of defining arbitration, it is surprising 
that the Court has yet to define the term. Some lower courts define 
arbitration as any process that resembles “classic arbitration”—an 
adversarial system complete with a hearing, witnesses, documents, 
evidence, arguments, and a neutral decision maker.97 Other lower courts 
consider whether the process is likely to involve a binding “settlement,” 
promoting the finality of arbitration.98 In the 2011 Concepcion decision, 
the Supreme Court described what “arbitration” is, but the Court’s image 
of arbitration is not grounded in the text of the FAA.99 The Court’s 
description in Concepcion is essentially the “classic” definition of 
arbitration, but with the explicit requirement that the arbitration be 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Compare id. at 1086 (holding that state law, and not the FAA, controls where the FAA 
neither defines arbitration, nor spells out the instant issue), with Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate No. 0510135, 707 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We have 
not directly addressed whether federal courts should look to state law or federal common law for the 
definition of ‘arbitration’ under the FAA. We do so now and hold that federal common law 
provides the definition of ‘arbitration’ under the FAA.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 155 (2013). Given 
the incorporation of state law into the FAA in the savings clause, an argument can be made that the 
definition of “arbitration” should be determined under state law. 
 95. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 96. See, e.g., Portland Gen. Elec., 218 F.3d at 1086 (reversing the district court’s treatment of 
a final appraisal decision as an arbitration under the FAA and ruling that “because the FAA neither 
defines arbitration nor spells out whether the term arbitration includes appraisal, we look to state 
law” (emphasis added)). For instance, some commentators refer to “binding mediation” as a process 
in which a mediator gives either a recommended or a binding outcome if the parties reach impasse. 
Questions would arise whether this type of procedure would constitute “arbitration,” especially if 
the parties are bound by the “mediator’s” decision at the end of the process. See generally Kristen 
M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality When the Same Neutral Serves Both 
as Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 317 (2011) (discussing the 
hybrid ADR “arbitration–mediation” process and the potential drawbacks thereof vis-à-vis 
traditional arbitral cases). 
 97. See, e.g., Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(noting that whether a given process is an “arbitration” depends on “how closely the specified 
procedure resembles classic arbitration”). 
 98. See, e.g., Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 349 (3d Cir. 1997); Salt Lake 
Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 690 (10th Cir. 2004).   
 99. The Supreme Court’s refusal to define arbitration is not due to bad advocacy. In fact, the 
Supreme Court has received multiple requests for the Court to define arbitration. Already once in 
the 2013–2014 term, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on a case that would put this question 
squarely before the Court. See Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Issuing 
Certificate No. 0510135, 134 S. Ct. 155 (2013). The Court’s repeated refusal to define arbitration 
affects the scope of FAA preemption. 
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bilateral—between two parties.100 Notably, the Supreme Court’s recent 
jurisprudence instructs that class arbitration is not “arbitration” as the FAA 
uses the term.101 Congress, however, remains silent on issues regarding 
class arbitration, and the Court’s recent description of arbitration as an 
efficient, bilateral proceeding has already begun to impact the Court’s 
preemption jurisprudence. 
B.  Fundamental Flaw II: Not Defining the Type or Scope of FAA 
Preemption 
Prior to Southland, courts and scholars often had to consider the power 
under which Congress passed the FAA. If passed under the Constitution’s 
Article I Commerce Power, then the FAA would be “substantive” law 
applicable in both state and federal courts.102 If passed under the Article III 
power to regulate the courts, then the FAA would be merely federal 
“procedural” law applicable only in federal courts.103 
Congress passed the FAA prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,104 which held that federal 
courts should apply state substantive law in diversity cases.105 After Erie, 
questions arose regarding the application of the FAA in diversity cases. In 
1956, the Court ruled in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America106 that 
arbitration law is “substantive” under Erie and that state law should apply 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011); see also Cole, 
Federalization of Consumer Arbitration, supra note 11, at 282 (noting that “class action arbitration 
is not arbitration (though the FAA does not define arbitration),” according to the Court). 
 101. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748; Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 
500, 504 (2012); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). But see 
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013) (holding that an arbitrator’s 
finding that the parties’ contract provided for class arbitration “survives the limited judicial review” 
permitted under the FAA). In her article on this topic, Professor Sarah Cole states that by “defining 
arbitration [as in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion], the Court may be sending a signal that FAA 
preemption, even in areas that the FAA does not address, is likely to occur.” Cole, Federalization of 
Consumer Arbitration, supra note 11, at 289.  
 102. See Craig Smith & Eric V. Moyé, Outsourcing American Civil Justice: Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 288–91 
(2012). The FAA is considered an anomaly in that even those who support finding that Congress 
passed the FAA under its commerce power concede that the FAA does not give jurisdiction to the 
federal courts, its status as “substantive” law notwithstanding. See Charles E. Harris II, Enforcing 
Arbitral Subpoenas: Reconsidering Federal Question Jurisdiction Under FAA Section 7, DISP. RES. 
J., Aug./Oct. 2011, at 24, 30 n.14 (2011) (noting the characterization of the FAA as an “anomaly”). 
 103. See Dunham, supra note 5, at 341–43 (noting Southland’s dramatic divergence from fifty-
nine years of precedent: “[A]lmost every case decided between 1938 and 1984 reaffirmed the 
USAA, and subsequently the FAA, as an Article III procedural act”); Smith & Moyé, supra note 
102, at 287–88. 
 104. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 105. Id. at 78.  
 106. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).  
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in diversity cases unless the arbitration agreement evidences a transaction 
in “commerce.”107  
The Bernhardt decision prompted further Court analysis on the 
“substantive vs. procedural” question in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Manufacturing Co.108 The Prima Paint Court found that the 
underlying contract involved “commerce,” thus satisfying the Bernhardt 
test.109 The Court went on to address concerns about Erie, noting that 
whether substantive or procedural, “Congress may prescribe how federal 
courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which 
Congress plainly has power to legislate.”110 The Court further stated: “[I]t 
is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and 
confined to the incontestable federal foundations of control over interstate 
commerce and over admiralty.”111 The Court relied on legislative history to 
come to this conclusion,112 invoking a strong dissent.113 The case was 
silent, however, on the issue of preemption because that issue was not 
before the Court.  
Twenty years later, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,114 the Court held that 
the FAA is substantive federal law with preemptive power. The Court also 
held that the FAA applies in federal and state courts, thus answering any 
lingering questions from Bernhardt and Prima Paint.115 The Court found 
that the California franchise law at issue116 was in direct conflict with the 
FAA, because the California law would require litigation of claims that the 
parties would otherwise arbitrate.117 Relying on Prima Paint, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 107. See id. at 202–03. For an in-depth analysis of the implications of Erie and Bernhardt on 
arbitration, see Hirshman, supra note 64, at 1309–24. 
 108. 388 U.S. 395, 422 (1967). 
 109. Id. at 405. 
 110. Id. The issue of preemption was not before the Court. The case progressed through the 
federal courts under diversity jurisdiction, and no questions of state law arose in the case. Id. at 404. 
In addition, the Court specifically found that the contract in question involved interstate commerce. 
Id. at 401. 
 111. Id. at 405 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Richard A. Bales & Mark B Gerano, Oddball Arbitration, 30 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 405, 408 (2013) (providing that Prima Paint, by holding that the FAA 
was created under the commerce power, “circumvent[ed] the problem that Erie created”). 
 112. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 & n.13. 
 113. The dissenting Justices found that the legislative history was “clear” that Congress passed 
the FAA under the power to regulate the courts. Id. at 418–20 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 114. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 115. Id. at 14–16. 
 116. The franchise law, as interpreted by the California courts, required litigation of claims 
falling within its reach. Thus, the arbitration agreement at issue was unenforceable. Id. at 10 (“The 
California Supreme Court interpreted this statute to require judicial consideration of claims brought 
under the state statute and accordingly refused to enforce the parties’ contract to arbitrate such 
claims.”). 
 117. Id. In examining the FAA, the Court interpreted the Act to have only two limitations on 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements. First, the agreement must be in writing and be part of a 
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concluded: “The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress 
to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.”118 Despite this 
momentous shift in the law, the Court said surprisingly little about the type 
or scope of preemption at issue. In a footnote, Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger noted that the California statute at issue was not a defense in law or 
equity “for the revocation of any contract” but applied only to franchise 
contracts, setting up the “any contract” test for preemption.119 Under the 
“any contract” test, a state law is subject to preemption under the FAA if it 
treats agreements to arbitrate differently than other types of contracts.120 
Interestingly, the Court never uses the word “obstacle” or invokes any of 
the routine presumptions that help promote the healthy balance of federal 
and state regulation contemplated in the FAA. While the “any contract” 
test is uncontroversial in and of itself, the manner in which the Court 
created the test is notable because the Court addressed the matter in a 
footnote without fleshing out the boundaries and principles underlying 
preemption under the FAA. 
In the next term, the Supreme Court, in Perry v. Thomas,121 confronted 
a similar issue in another California statute that required judicial resolution 
of claims by employees to collect wages.122 The Court began by noting the 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”123 and cited 
Southland for the proposition that Congress intended to “foreclose state 
legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements.”124 The Perry Court added in a footnote: “[S]tate law, whether 
of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern 
issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 
                                                                                                                     
maritime contract or one “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” Id. at 10–11. Second, the 
agreement must not be revoked upon “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.” Id.  
 118. Id. at 11.  
 119. Id. at 16 n.11; see also Horton, supra note 2, at 1228–29; STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES 
OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 34–36 (2d ed. 2007). Essentially, the “any contract” test 
applies when a state regulation would make arbitration agreements unenforceable when the same 
test would not make all contracts meeting the same criteria unenforceable. See id. at 36.  
 120. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1226–32. 
 121. 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
 122. The California statute at issue provided that “actions for the collection of wages may be 
maintained ‘without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.’” Id. at 484 
(quoting CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 229 (West 1971)). This statute, unlike the statute at issue in 
Southland, actually included the words “agreement to arbitrate.”  
 123. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). Professors Richard Bales and Mark Gerano describe the expansion of 
arbitration law in Moses H. Cone as follows: “The important aspect of Moses H. Cone was the 
Court’s declaration that the FAA applied in both federal and state courts. Equally important in 
Moses H. Cone was the Court’s recognition of the strong policy favoring arbitration, and that when 
in doubt regarding arbitrability, the preference should be to arbitrate.” Bales & Gerano, supra note 
111, at 410 (footnotes omitted). 
 124. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added) (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 16).  
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generally,” while state laws specifically invalidating arbitration agreements 
do not comport with section 2.125 The language suggests that preemption 
applies when a state law—like this California law—singles out arbitration 
agreements and makes them unenforceable.126 The Court still failed to 
discuss the type of preemption—conflict or otherwise—and it left the 
scope of the preemption unsettled, at best.127   
Finally, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland 
Stanford Junior University128 is instructive on the issue of preemption, 
although it turned on the effect of a California choice-of-law provision in 
the contract.129 Under California law, the parties would need to litigate 
certain issues before arbitrating the remainder of the claims.130 In enforcing 
the choice-of-law clause, the Court found section 4 of the FAA controlling, 
requiring courts to enforce arbitration agreements “in the manner provided 
for” in the contract.131 The Court stressed that one of the purposes of the 
FAA is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement and 
that an arbitration agreement be “placed upon the same footing as other 
contracts, where it belongs.”132 The Court grappled with the policy 
pronouncements made in a prior case, broadly stating that “the federal 
policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of 
private agreements to arbitrate.”133 The Court, however, did not specify 
whether the “according to their terms” language stems from section 4 or 
whether this policy also emerges from section 2’s preemptive effect.  
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 492 n.9. 
 126. Professor David Horton parses out the language of the footnotes in Southland and Perry 
to provide two different tests for preemption: “Were . . . state policies preempted because, as 
Southland suggested, section 2 denies state legislators the ability to regulate arbitration clauses? Or, 
following Perry, should courts ask whether these laws expressed hostility to arbitration?” Horton, 
supra note 2, at 1231. This parsing may draw too fine a distinction between the cases and give more 
credit to the Court than it deserves.  
 127. The Perry case involved a 7–2 decision. Justice Stevens wrote a short dissent on the basis 
that the policy articulated by the state of California should take precedence over the general federal 
statute. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor also dissented, 
primarily on the grounds that Southland was wrongly decided. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Justice O’Connor also dissented on the grounds that the policy articulated by California should 
control. Id. at 495.  
 128. 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 129. Id. at 470, 472, 479. 
 130. Id. at 471 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1982) (providing that a court 
may stay arbitration while litigation with a third party is ongoing and the possibility of conflicting 
rulings on issues of common law or fact exists)). In this multi-party contract dispute, some parties 
had an obligation to arbitrate while others did not. The California statute, which applies in multi-
party situations, required the parties to litigate. After litigation was complete, the parties subject to 
arbitration agreements would be allowed to arbitrate. 
 131. Id. at 474–75 (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988)). 
 132. Id. at 476, 478 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. Id. at 476 (discussing the rule from Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corporation, 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).  
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The Court then, for the first time, discussed the applicable type of 
preemption in a case in which preemption was not before the Court. The 
Court recognized that the FAA “contains no express pre-emptive provision, 
nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of 
arbitration,”134 and that the state law that “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress” should be preempted.135 Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
the California statute was not preempted because the statute had not 
eliminated the arbitration option, only delayed it.136 For the first time, the 
Court explicitly referenced the applicability of conflict preemption and 
denounced the application of field preemption due to federalism concerns. 
The Court stated in dicta that the FAA would not have preempted the 
California statute because it delayed but did not invalidate the 
arbitration.137 As a practical matter, the delay would effectively negate 
arbitration under traditional preclusion principles.138 The Court’s 
willingness to find this statute enforceable is a strong statement of the 
limited nature of the FAA’s preemptive scope. 
Thus, the decisions of the 1980s established FAA preemption without 
any real explanation of the scope or type of preemption. The Court gave 
some indication that preemption should be narrowly applied. However, its 
failure to place clear boundaries in these early cases left plenty of room for 
later expansion.   
C.  Fundamental Flaw II Expanded 
The 1990s brought gradual expansion of the FAA. As the Court applied 
the preemption doctrine during this time period, it expanded the 
preemptive scope without clearly defining the boundaries of the FAA’s 
reach. The Court’s failure therefore allows for expansion of the doctrine on 
a case-by-case basis. 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Id. at 477 (emphasis added). 
 135. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Id. at 477–79. This distinction between delaying arbitration and denying arbitration is 
critical. 
 137. See id. at 479 (“Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so 
too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted. Where, as 
here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to 
the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that 
arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward.” (citation omitted)). In 
1996, the Court further explained this holding: “[t]he state rule examined in Volt determined only 
the efficient order of proceedings; it did not affect the enforceability of the arbitration agreement 
itself.” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996). 
 138. The dissent, which does not touch on the issue of preemption, noted the practical effect of 
the requirement to the situation: “Applying the California procedural rule, which stays arbitration 
while litigation of the same issue goes forward, means simply that the parties’ dispute will be 
litigated rather than arbitrated.” Volt, 489 U.S. at 487 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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For example, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,139 the Court 
expanded the reach of the FAA to the full contours of the Commerce 
Clause. That case, which involved the sale of a termite-infested Alabama 
house,140 pitted an Alabama statute invalidating all predispute arbitration 
agreements141 against the FAA, which would enforce such agreements. To 
avoid preemption, the homeowner argued that the contract did not “involve 
interstate commerce” pursuant to section 2 of the FAA.142 The Court 
determined, however, that these words should be read to the fullest extent 
of the Commerce Clause,143 relying on the purpose of the FAA to 
“broadly” overcome “judicial hostility to arbitration agreements” at both 
the state and federal levels.144 The mere use of the word “broadly,” 
however, can hardly be deemed a test regarding the preemptive scope of 
the FAA. 
The Justices in the Terminix case were deeply divided on this issue. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in a concurring opinion, expressed doubt 
that the FAA should have preemptive effect at all, especially because states 
have historically regulated arbitration.145 Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas dissented on the basis that Southland should be 
overruled.146 The majority, however, refused to overrule Southland and 
ultimately expanded its reach by construing “interstate commerce” to the 
full extent of the commerce power.  
This gradual expansion continued in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc.,147 technically another choice-of-law decision.148 Like in Volt, 
the parties had a contract with both an arbitration agreement and a choice-
of-law clause (selecting New York law).149 Controlling New York law—
the Garrity rule—prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive 
                                                                                                                     
 139. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 140. Id. at 268. 
 141. Id. at 269 (citing ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1975) (“The following obligations cannot be 
specifically enforced: . . . An agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration.”)). 
 142. Brief of Respondents G. Michael Dobson and Wanda C. Dobson at 4, 9, Allied-Bruce, 
513 U.S. 265 (No. 93-1001), 1994 WL 381849. 
 143. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277. Twenty state attorneys general requested that the Court 
overrule Southland. Id. at 272. 
 144. Id. at 272. 
 145. Id. at 283 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that under the Court’s own precedent, 
Congress must evidence a “clear and manifest” intent to preempt in areas traditionally regulated by 
the states (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 146. See id. at 285–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 147. 514 U.S. 52 (1995). The Court decided Mastrobuono and Terminix in the same term, and 
these cases turn on ideologically similar lines regarding the breadth of the FAA.  
 148. See id. at 55 (granting certiorari to resolve a conflict in the courts of appeals as to whether 
a contractual choice-of-law provision may preclude an arbitrator from awarding punitive damages).   
 149. Id. at 54–55. 
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damages.150 The ruling of Volt generally allowed parties to agree to 
arbitration procedures different than the FAA.151 While the Mastrobuono 
Court determined as a matter of contract law that the parties’ agreement 
allowed an award of punitive damages, the opinion included additional 
language on the lasting effect of the Garrity rule.152 The Court stated that 
“punitive damages would be allowed because, in the absence of contractual 
intent to the contrary, the FAA would pre-empt the Garrity rule.”153  
This statement signals a significant expansion of the Court’s 
preemption jurisprudence. Prior to Mastrobuono, the Court had only 
preempted state laws invalidating the parties’ agreement to participate in 
the arbitral forum.154 In this instance, the parties did not dispute the 
requirement to arbitrate. They disagreed on the terms and conditions under 
which the arbitration would take place—whether punitive damages may be 
awarded. The New York law at issue limited the parties’ ability to contract 
for how the arbitration would take place, and the Court found that this 
limitation, only applicable to arbitration agreements, ran afoul of the 
FAA.155 Certainly, this case departed from the Court’s decision in Volt, 
that a state law effectively (but not legally) foreclosing the arbitral option 
was not preempted because the arbitration option remained a legal 
possibility.156  
Justice Thomas stated, in his dissent in Mastrobuono,157 that 
“[t]hankfully, the import of the majority’s decision is limited and narrow” 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Id. (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)). The Garrity rule is 
grounded in the policy that awarding punitive damages is something that only a public institution, 
such as the courts, can do. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794. Under the Garrity rule, private arbitrators 
are prohibited from awarding punitive damages. Id.  
 151. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989)). 
 152. Id. at 59–60. 
 153. Id. at 59; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme Court’s 
Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 17 (2014) [hereinafter Drahozal, Error 
Correction] (describing the relationship between Volt and Mastrobuono). 
 154. See, e.g., Volt, 489 U.S. at 478.   
 155. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58; see also Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in 
Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of 
State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 548 (1994) (“Garrity refuses to enforce arbitration 
agreements giving arbitrators the power to award punitive damages. Because Garrity singles out 
arbitration agreements and limits their enforceability, it is preempted by the FAA.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
 156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 157. Justice Thomas dissented in this opinion, not necessarily on the preemption issue, but on 
the contract interpretation issue and the correct reading of the Volt decision. See Mastrobuono, 514 
U.S. at 66–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Until recently, Justice Thomas was the most consistent vote 
in the preemption cases, ruling that the FAA should not apply to the states. Justice Thomas’s dissent 
did not address the statement made by the majority on the preemptive effect of the FAA over the 
Garrity rule. See id. (dissenting on the grounds that the holding enforced a choice-of-law provision 
that could not be distinguished from Volt).  
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and has “applicability only to this specific contract and to no other.”158 
Perhaps this decision foreshadowed the Court’s decision in Concepcion, 
nearly twenty years later, when the Court expressly preempted another 
state law that did not invalidate agreements to arbitrate. 
The following year, the Court decided Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto,159 which involved a “classic” preemption situation. The 
Casarotto case concerned a Subway sandwich shop franchise dispute in 
Montana.160 Montana law required that an arbitration agreement “shall be 
typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.”161 The 
franchise agreement’s arbitration clause did not meet this requirement.162 
The Supreme Court easily preempted this law, stating that: “Courts may 
not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable 
only to arbitration provisions.”163 The FAA preempted the Montana law 
because the “first page of the contract” rule applied only to arbitration 
agreements.164 The Court found this statute hostile to arbitration, thus 
running afoul of section 2 of the FAA.165  
In addition, the Court identified as a “purpose” of the FAA the idea that 
Congress intended the Act to ensure “that private agreements to arbitrate 
are enforced according to their terms.”166 When the Volt Court used this 
language, it was discussing parties’ ability to enforce a choice-of-law 
provision.167 Notably, the Court did not use this language in the 
preemption analysis.168 As noted above,169 the “according to their terms” 
language is part of section 4—a procedural portion of the FAA—and not 
section 2—the only substantive section the Court has applied to the 
states.170 One might argue that the Supreme Court attempted to incorporate 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 71–72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 159. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).  
 160. Id. at 682–84.  
 161. Id. at 684 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995) (repealed 1997)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 687. 
 164. See id. (reasoning that the Court has consistently provided that the FAA precludes states 
from “singling out arbitration provisions”). 
 165. Id. The Casarotto case was an 8–1 decision of the Court. Id. at 682. Justice Thomas was 
the lone dissenting vote, and he dissented on the grounds that the FAA should not apply to the 
states. Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s vote was consistent with his previous 
rulings in the area of FAA preemption. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 
285 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 
64 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 166. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).  
 167. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (“[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself.”). 
 168. See id. at 477–79 (setting forth the Court’s preemption analysis).   
 169. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 n.6 (“While we have held that the FAA’s ‘substantive’ 
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the “according to their terms” language into section 2, but a change so 
substantial should ordinarily not be assumed sub silencio.   
The resulting test coming out of Casarotto provides additional 
clarification that although states may regulate contracts generally, they may 
not invalidate agreements to arbitrate simply because they are agreements 
to arbitrate. Although the test is easily definable, the Court still refrains 
from identifying the type of preemption at issue (again, presumably 
conflict preemption) or applying traditional preemption presumptions—the 
narrow application of preemption, for instance—especially in the area of 
conflict preemption.  
These cases from the 1990s and early 2000s171 arguably broadened the 
scope of the preemptive power without ever defining what arbitration is 
and without clearly identifying the type of preemption to apply or the scope 
of preemptive power. These failures set up the Court’s expansive ruling in 
Concepcion. 
D.  Fundamental Flaw III: Impact Preemption 
The Court’s new preemption test, herein coined “impact preemption,” 
begins with the 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.172 In 
Concepcion, the Court considered whether a California common law test 
regarding class action waivers ran afoul of FAA section 2.173 The 
Concepcions and similar customers bought “free” phones but were later 
charged sales tax in the amount of $30.22, based on the phone’s value.174 
The Concepcions brought a class action against AT&T even though the 
contract required arbitration on an individual basis.175 Under the California 
common law test provided in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,176 the 
                                                                                                                     
provisions—§§ 1 and 2—are applicable in state as well as federal court, we have never held that 
§§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court . . . .” (citation 
omitted)).   
 171. Although not otherwise discussed in this Article, the Court’s decision in Preston v. Ferrer 
expanded the preemptive scope of the FAA in cases involving administrative agencies. 552 U.S. 
346, 349–50 (2008). 
 172. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 173. Id. at 1746.   
 174. Id. at 1744. The Concepcion case likely would not have proceeded without class action 
relief. Each individual plaintiff incurred damages in the amount of $30.22, and no rational plaintiff 
would pay a court filing fee or hire a lawyer to recover this small sum of money. In an attempt to 
make the dispute resolution clause less challengeable on the grounds of unconscionability, AT&T 
added a “premium payment” of $7500. Id. at 1744–45. Under the contract, if a plaintiff refused a 
settlement offer and thereafter won more at arbitration, that party was awarded a “premium 
payment” of $7500 plus twice the amount of attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1744. Even with this premium 
payment, the chances of hiring a lawyer for this small amount of money are slim.  
 175. Id. The arbitration agreement provided that claims be brought in a party’s “individual 
capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding” 
in either arbitration or court. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 176. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).   
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Court found the class action waiver unconscionable.177 If the Discover 
Bank test was met, the California court would strike the class action 
waiver, but the agreement to arbitrate may remain enforceable.178 
The Court recognized the “liberal policy in favor of arbitration” along 
with the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”179 
The Court further recognized that arbitration agreements must be regulated 
“on an equal footing with other contracts,” citing Volt for the proposition 
that arbitration agreements must be enforced “according to their terms.”180 
Again, the Court used the phrase “according to their terms” to describe the 
policies underlying section 2, when that language comes from section 4’s 
procedural mandate. The Court did not address whether that language 
should be incorporated into section 2.  
In the opinion, the Court also appeared to recognize the role of state 
regulatory authority. The Court stated that the FAA savings clause 
normally allows states to develop their own “‘generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. The Discover Bank rule would invalidate any such class 
action waiver if the following elements are met: (1) the contract is one of adhesion; (2) the disputes 
involve a predictably small amount of damages; and (3) the party with superior bargaining power 
has “carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.” Id. at 1746 (quoting Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110). The Discover Bank 
test was intended to deal with the classic problem of what happens when a large company cheats 
1,000,000 customers out of $1 each. While each individual only suffers $1 in damages, the 
company gains $1,000,000. Cf. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108–09 (“Class action and arbitration 
waivers are not, in the abstract, exculpatory clauses. But because, as discussed above, damages in 
consumer cases are often small and because [a] company which wrongfully exacts a dollar from 
each of millions of customers will reap a handsome profit, the class action is often the only effective 
way to halt and redress such exploitation.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 178. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (noting that the waivers themselves are unconscionable 
where Discover Bank is satisfied and citing California cases in which the courts did not enforce the 
agreement). Under traditional severability (not to be confused with separability, mentioned above) 
analysis in contract law, if a court were to find that one offending provision permeates or taints the 
entire agreement, the entire agreement may be invalidated. See generally 17A AM. JUR. 2D 
Contracts § 318 (2004) (“While recognizing that illegal contracts are generally unenforceable or 
void, a court may, where possible, sever the illegal portion of the agreement and enforce the 
remainder.” (footnotes omitted)); Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling 
Procedure: Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1952 (2014) 
(“Accordingly, when a court invalidates certain provisions in an arbitration clause as 
unconscionable, it should preserve the remainder of the arbitration clause for claims as to which the 
arbitral procedural bundle is not unconscionable.”). 
 179. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 180. Id. at 1745–46 (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 
(2006) and Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 
(1989)). 
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that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that 
an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”181  
The question became whether the Discover Bank test was “generally 
applicable.” Unlike the Montana law in Casarotto, the Discover Bank test 
was facially neutral and applied to class action waivers in arbitration and 
litigation alike.182 While acknowledging this point, the Court created a new 
test for arbitration preemption: whether the state law can be “applied in a 
fashion that disfavors arbitration” and has a “disproportionate impact” on 
arbitration.183 The Court further stated that the operation of the rule in 
“practice,” not the text of the statute, should determine the impact on 
arbitration.184  
In settling on this new test, the Court relied on “[t]he overarching 
purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, . . . to ensure the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to 
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”185 The Court built its reasoning on the 
premise that an important purpose of the FAA was to enforce agreements 
in which parties choose the more streamlined process of arbitration over 
the more elaborate process of litigation. Again, the Court appears to be 
conflating the purposes of sections 2, 3, and 4, even though section 2 is the 
only section that applies to the states. 
The Court suggested that the FAA would additionally preempt 
(hypothetical) state laws deeming unconscionable arbitration agreements 
lacking “judicially monitored discovery,” adherence to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, or arbitration by jury, because requiring arbitration to include 
these aspects of litigation would effectively convert the more streamlined 
process into an elaborate process that no longer resembled “arbitration” as 
that process was envisioned by Congress when it enacted the FAA.186 
Drawing on these principles, the Court held that “[r]equiring the 
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes 
of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”187  
                                                                                                                     
 181. Id. at 1746 (emphasis added) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
687 (1996)). 
 182. The Discover Bank rule, in practice, had been applied to cases involving class action bans 
in litigation as well as arbitration. See, e.g., Lopez v. Am. Express Bank, No. CV 09-07335 SJO 
(MANx), 2010 WL 2628659, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2010) (addressing an arbitration class 
waiver); Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting the 
application of the Discover Bank test to litigation and arbitration class waivers): Am. Online, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 711–13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (addressing an arbitration class 
waiver). In practice, the test had been used more often in the arbitration context. 
 183. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (emphasis added). 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. at 1748. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Id. 
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The Court ultimately found that certain generally applicable contract 
defenses—here unconscionability—that “stand as an obstacle” to the 
FAA’s objectives can be preempted.188 Although drawing from Casarotto, 
Perry, and previous arbitration cases, this language marks a notable 
expansion of preemptive power. The focus on the “impact” of regulation 
on arbitration is unsupported by section 2 and arguably goes beyond the 
purposes of sections 2, 3, and 4—if the Court was proper in reading the 
purposes of sections 3 and 4 into section 2. Under this new test for 
arbitration preemption, the Court can now: (1) invalidate facially neutral 
regulations; (2) invalidate generally applicable contract defenses (such as 
unconscionability) based on the “impact” on arbitration; and (3) disregard 
the savings clause. Now, a statute that somehow “disfavors arbitration” or 
has a “disproportionate impact” on arbitration without actually invalidating 
the agreement to arbitrate can be preempted.189 The Court’s analysis also 
failed to rely on traditional preemption principles.190  
The Concepcion decision is also notable because the Court attempts to 
define “arbitration” for the first time. The Court appears to favor 
bilateral—between two parties—arbitration because class arbitration is 
“slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass” than 
“classic” arbitration.191 The Court also reasoned that arbitrators might have 
difficulty handling the increased formality of class arbitration (unless, of 
course, the parties explicitly contract for such a procedure).192 Further, 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Id.  
 189. See id. at 1747. This case is the first time since Mastrobuono in which the Court found a 
state law that did not invalidate an arbitration agreement preempted by the FAA. Note, however, 
that the Mastrobuono Court’s discussion of the enforceability of the Garrity punitive damages rule 
was merely dicta because the case turned on the choice-of-law determination. See supra notes 147–
55 and accompanying text. 
 190. At the end of the majority opinion, the Court cites to a single general preemption case: 
“Because it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress,’ California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.” Concepcion, 
131 S. Ct. at 1753 (citation omitted) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
Court “politics” appear to be at play in this decision. Up to this point, Justice Thomas had 
dissented on principle to every case involving FAA preemption on the grounds that the FAA does 
not apply to the states. See supra notes 157, 165 and accompanying text. In Concepcion, however, 
Justice Thomas joined the majority for the first time to give the majority its necessary fifth vote, and 
also filed a concurring opinion. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.  
 191. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. The Court notes that “while it is theoretically possible to 
select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators are 
not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the 
protection of absent parties.” Id. at 1750. At least one scholar asserts that after Concepcion, the 
scope of FAA preemption allows the Court to paint “a picture of arbitration and preempt state laws 
that are incompatible with that picture.” Troum, supra note 60, at 427.  
 192. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751–52; see also Troum, supra note 60, at 421 (describing the 
Court’s view of class arbitration as the “incompatibility” of class procedures with the FAA).  
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“classic” arbitration did not involve the same “risks to defendants” 193 and 
“high[] stakes.”194 Despite these criticisms of complex, multiparty 
arbitration, the Court must still acknowledge that freedom of contract 
allows parties to agree to these types of procedures.195 As expected, the 
case drew strong dissent, largely on federalism grounds.196  
This decision marked a critical turning point in Supreme Court 
preemption jurisprudence. For the first time, the Court invalidated a state 
law197 not because it invalidated an arbitration agreement, but because it 
“impacted” a newly articulated type of arbitration—bilateral arbitration.198 
By characterizing the “purpose” of the FAA as preserving bilateral 
arbitration, the Court widely redefined arbitration preemption.199 While the 
Concepcion decision has been roundly criticized on a wide variety of 
grounds,200 this Article largely focuses on the Court’s treatment of 
preemption, as opposed to its treatment of class actions. 
                                                                                                                     
 193. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752. Note that the Court was not concerned about the risks to 
claimants in having to bring low stakes claims without a lawyer or whether claimants in arbitration 
would be similarly disadvantaged by high-stakes procedures. 
 194. Id. at 1750. The Court is in a precarious situation in that the right to contract would allow 
parties to have a class-wide procedure if all of the parties agreed to such a procedure. The Court 
essentially speaks out of both sides of its mouth in denouncing the class-wide procedure as a whole 
and then needing to admit that parties could opt for such a procedure if they so choose. 
 195. Id. at 1752. 
 196. See id. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress retained for the States an important role 
incident to agreements to arbitrate.”). 
 197. As noted in Mastrobuono, the Court’s statements regarding the enforceability of the New 
York Garrity rule dealing with punitive damages were dicta. See supra note 189; Drahozal, FAA 
Preemption, supra note 86, at 415. The Court, however, did indicate a willingness to overturn that 
rule, which had nothing to do with the enforceability of arbitration agreements. See supra notes 
147–55 and accompanying text (noting that the Garrity rule limited the parties’ ability to contract). 
 198. The Court’s loose language on the preemptive power of the FAA has confused scholars 
on what can be preempted. Because the preemption power has to be limited to section 2 of the FAA, 
state laws that do not invalidate arbitration agreements cannot be in conflict with section 2. Now, 
however, the Court has created a misconception that any law that treats arbitration differently than 
other contracts could be preempted. See Troum, supra note 60, at 424 (“State contract law controls 
the interpretation of arbitration agreements, just as it does all contracts, but that law must treat 
arbitration agreements like all other agreements. Otherwise, the FAA’s section 2 preemption power 
kicks in and the state law is preempted. Concepcion is an example of just such a flexing of the 
FAA’s preemption muscle.” (footnote omitted)). 
 199. Interestingly, Justice Scalia takes the lead in authoring this decision. As noted above, 
Justice Scalia had previously concurred in the Terminix case expressing a viewpoint that Southland 
and the entirety of FAA preemption should be overruled. See supra note 146 and accompanying 
text. Yet Justice Scalia has been the author of the recent decisions that have created this new ad hoc 
business preemption and changed the legal landscape in this area. 
 200. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative 
Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1204–05 (2013) (noting the perspicuous 
consequences of Concepcion and noting that “[r]ecent scholarship has established that Concepcion 
fundamentally misreads the original purpose and design of the FAA”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 269 (2013) (noting that an extension 
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At least two arguments can be made to support the contention that the 
Court is actually applying traditional obstacle preemption and not a new 
test. First, one may argue that one of the purposes of the FAA is to enforce 
contracts “according to their terms,” and that the Discover Bank test 
frustrates this purpose by invalidating class action waivers. As noted 
above, this argument is based on a purpose drawn from section 4 of the 
FAA, which courts have not given preemptive power. Under usual 
preemption analysis, the purposes of the whole statute can be considered in 
determining its purposes and objectives. The FAA, on the other hand, is 
unique in that only one small portion—section 2—has preemptive 
power,201 while the rest of the statute is arguably procedural in nature. To 
date, the Court has not appreciated the complexity involved in applying 
preemption principles to a statute that only has partial preemptive power. 
This Article suggests that because section 2 contains an express limitation 
regarding state law invalidating arbitration agreements, regulations that fall 
short of invalidation do not fall within the preemptive scope of the FAA. 
Application of the broader policies based on the text of sections 3 and 4 
should not be used to expand and contradict the plain language of section 
2. 
The second argument could be made on the basis of the language of 
section 2 itself. This argument is that the Court is reading “bilateral” into 
the definition of “arbitration,” as that term is used in section 2, and the 
Discover Bank test then stands as an obstacle to the purposes of the FAA 
because class arbitration is not arbitration as the FAA defines that term. 
This avoids the problems of the first argument by stating that the difficulty 
is not with the invalidation of the arbitration agreement, but with the 
definition of arbitration.  
This argument, too, suffers from textual and logical flaws. The FAA 
does not define “arbitration.” Until Concepcion, the Court had not 
attempted to define the term. The discussion of what arbitration means in 
Concepcion is not concrete. In other words, the Court only talked about 
arbitration in terms of certain characteristics such as streamlined 
procedures and simplicity. It did not state whether class arbitration could 
meet those parameters, especially when compared to class action litigation. 
In addition, the Court acknowledged that parties could agree to class action 
procedures as a matter of contractual choice. Arguably parties could 
contract for a procedure that could not be regulated by the states. Another 
counterargument is that class arbitration has to be arbitration otherwise the 
FAA would not apply at all. If class arbitration is truly outside of the realm 
                                                                                                                     
of the Concepcion analysis from the realm of consumer claims to employment claims would “raise 
serious social equality concerns”); Bales & Gerano, supra note 111, at 424 (describing Concepcion 
as an “Oddball Case,” meaning in it created a wide-sweeping change in the law based on a case 
with atypical facts). 
 201. See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 86, at 398, 400.   
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of the FAA, then states should have the ability to regulate in the absence of 
any federal regulation on the subject.  
The next Section considers how the Court has begun to apply impact 
preemption. 
E.  Fundamental Flaw III in Practice 
Impact preemption has already influenced the law of arbitration. In the 
last few terms, the Supreme Court has continued to act early and often in 
the area of arbitration preemption, applying preemption principles broadly.  
In the term following Concepcion, the Court decided Marmet Health 
Care Center v. Brown,202 and preempted a West Virginia common law 
ruling invalidating arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts.203 
Although unremarkable in its holding, the Marmet case is interesting 
because of its timing. The Court sent a strong message to the states by 
taking the first case to matriculate through the West Virginia court system 
on this issue. The Marmet decision is a clean application of the Casarotto 
decision because the West Virginia law singled out certain arbitration 
agreements—in nursing home contracts—and invalidated them.204  
In 2012, the Court sent another message to the states regarding their 
role in arbitration in Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard.205 In this 
case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidated certain unemployment 
agreements that required arbitrators to decide arbitrability issues.206 The 
Court warned that: “It is a matter of great importance . . . that state 
supreme courts adhere to a correct interpretation” of the FAA,207 which 
includes the teachings from Prima Paint, Southland, and Concepcion. The 
Court strongly reprimanded the Oklahoma Supreme Court, stating that it 
“must abide by the FAA, which is ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and by 
the opinions of this Court interpreting that law. . . . Our cases hold that the 
FAA forecloses precisely this type of ‘judicial hostility towards 
                                                                                                                     
 202. 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam).   
 203. Id. at 1204. As Professor Horton notes, cases such as Marmet demonstrate what he calls 
the Court’s “total-preemption theory,” meaning that despite the “any contract” language in the 
savings clause of section 2, invalidating a contract on general “public policy” grounds would 
necessarily create arbitration-specific enforceability rules. Horton, supra note 2, at 1220. Under this 
theory, a state cannot create a valid public policy defense under the “any contract” clause because 
such defenses are necessarily arbitration specific. Id. In Marmet, West Virginia created a rule that 
all arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts were unenforceable. 132 S. Ct. at 1202. This 
state policy is specific both to nursing home contracts and arbitration clauses, thus not generally 
applicable to all contracts. Id. at 1202–03. Horton further notes that the FAA must deal with 
enforceability generally, otherwise states would have the ability to prohibit arbitration within the 
state’s borders on public policy grounds. Such laws would clearly contravene the primary goal of 
the FAA—enforcing private agreements to arbitrate. Horton, supra note 2, at 1220.  
 204. Marmet, 132 S. Ct. at 1203–04  
 205. 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam). 
 206. Id. at 501.  
 207. Id.  
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arbitration.’”208 While this decision is unspectacular in its outcome, it is 
worth noting because of the increased hostility the Court expressed toward 
the states.  
The 2013 decision American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant209 similarly demonstrates the Court’s willingness to cite 
Concepcion as authority. The question before the Court was whether an 
arbitration agreement could be enforced under the FAA when the 
“plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds 
the potential recovery.”210 Like Concepcion, the plaintiff merchants had 
arbitration agreements prohibiting class dispute resolution.211 The 
merchants argued that they would each need to spend up to $1 million in 
legal fees to recover damages of less than $40,000.212 While the Court 
ultimately concluded that the merchants could vindicate their statutory 
rights because they were not financially precluded from accessing the 
arbitral forum,213 the Court relied on the new definition of “arbitration” 
(i.e., bilateral arbitration) to uphold the class waiver.214 Although Italian 
Colors did not involve a question of preemption, the Court’s definition of 
arbitration in Concepcion paved the way for this decision.215 These recent 
cases demonstrate that the principles of Concepcion go beyond even the 
preemption area of the law. 
III.  A NEW THEORY OF FAA PREEMPTION: IMPACT PREEMPTION 
Express, field, and conflict preemption have a long jurisprudential 
history supported by well-defined tests on how preemption should be 
                                                                                                                     
 208. Id. at 503 (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI and AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011)). 
 209. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 210. Id. at 2307.   
 211. Id. at 2308. Prior to this case, precedent suggested that arbitration agreements could be 
invalidated if the structure of the agreement made it financially difficult to access the forum. Green 
Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (holding that the party seeking 
invalidation of an arbitration agreement on the basis that arbitration is prohibitively expensive bears 
the “burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs”). 
 212.  Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308. The primary expenses for the merchants would 
include legal fees and expert witness fees. 
 213. Id. at 2310–11 (distinguishing between the costs of accessing the arbitral forum and the 
costs of proving the merits of a claim). 
 214. Id. at 2312. 
 215. A month prior to the Italian Colors decision, the Supreme Court decided another case 
involving class actions. In Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013), the Court upheld 
an arbitrator’s decision to allow class action arbitration when the contract was silent on the issue. 
The Court distinguished the case from Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 
(2010), on the basis that the arbitrator permissibly read and interpreted the contract to allow class 
arbitration. Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 2070. The seemingly inconsistent holdings between these 
two cases will certainly lead to interesting discussion on whether Italian Colors overruled Sutter or 
merely reduced it to its facts.   
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applied to preserve the delicate balance between federal and state authority. 
In the area of arbitration, however, none of these rules seem to apply. The 
root of the problem lies in the fact that the Court historically failed to 
define the type of preemption to apply in cases involving the FAA, as well 
as the scope of that preemption.  
The Court’s analysis of arbitration has been the subject of multiple 
criticisms. Arbitration scholar Thomas Carbonneau recently noted that 
while the Justices:  
have created a body of doctrine, their interest in arbitration is 
neither principled nor analytical. The Court has rarely, if ever, 
expressed a serious interest in the intellectual content of 
arbitration law; instead, the Court plays the role of craftsman, 
fixated on elaborating workable rules that promote recourse to 
arbitration.216  
The Court has utterly failed to produce “workable rules” for arbitration 
preemption. Impact preemption goes far awry of traditional conflict 
preemption because it eliminates the requirement of a conflict. Without 
requiring a conflict, any state law may be subject to preemption simply 
because of its disproportionate “impact” on arbitration.217 In addition, this 
new test is broader than field preemption.  
The Court’s creation of impact preemption contains a number of 
theoretical, legal, and political flaws. These flaws drastically impact 
arbitration practice and policy, which has an adverse effect on states, 
businesses, consumers, employees, and other stakeholders. These next 
Sections detail why impact preemption is untenable under Supreme Court 
precedent, arbitration theory, and public policy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 216. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall 
Street Associates, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 593, 595 (2013) (footnote omitted). Other 
commentators have noted the lack of consistent rules within federal preemption law itself. See, e.g., 
Meltzer, supra note 38, at 3 (“With a plethora of cases known for their lack of consistency, a 
complex set of crosscurrents, a broad set of subject matters, and a recent significant shift in the 
stance of the executive branch . . . generalizations about the direction of preemption law are 
hazardous . . . .”).  
 217. For instance, each state has a statute that mirrors section 2 of the FAA. These provisions 
are obviously consistent with section 2. The drafters of the RUAA were keenly aware of preemption 
issues and have strived to suggest only model statutes that were consistent with the FAA or covered 
areas that the FAA did not address. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note, at 2 (2000) (“In 
light of a number of decisions by the United States Supreme Court concerning the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), any revision of the UAA must take into account the doctrine of 
preemption.”). 
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A.  Impact Preemption Is Not Supported by the Statutory Text 
As mentioned above, the FAA contains only sixteen short provisions 
and creates no regulatory agency to administer them.218 Of those sixteen 
provisions, only section 2 can have preemptive effect because the other 
sections contain express jurisdictional limitations, limiting the Act’s 
applicability to the federal courts.219 Section 2 accomplishes one purpose: 
enforcing arbitration agreements in the same way as other contracts. Prior 
to Concepcion, the Court’s preemption decisions involved state regulation 
that actually conflicted with section 2. For instance, Southland, Perry, 
Terminix, and Casarotto all involved state laws that invalidated arbitration 
agreements or placed conditions on their enforceability.220  
The text of section 2 does not support the Court’s new “impact” 
preemption test for at least three reasons. First, the Court built its new 
theory on a newly articulated image of arbitration. In the wake of statutory 
silence on what arbitration is, the Court in Concepcion, Nitro-Lift, and 
Italian Colors has painted a picture of what arbitration should—and should 
not—be. While not explicitly defining the term, the Court has described 
that arbitration should be “bilateral” and non-complex.221 What exactly is 
“bilateral”? Must it only involve two parties? Clearly, the Court views 
class procedures as inimical to its vision of bilateral arbitration;222 
however, consolidated actions (similar to class actions but without 
“absent” class members),223 multi-party disputes, or even cases involving 
three parties also might not constitute “bilateral” arbitration. Is an 
arbitration that begins with two commercial parties but later includes 
impleaded or third-party claims still bilateral? The answers to these 
questions are unclear. Further, the Court now envisions time- and cost-
saving efficiencies as a necessary part of arbitration. If that is true, can 
                                                                                                                     
 218. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). Chapter 2 of Title 9 deals with international arbitration and is 
thus not applicable to this discussion. See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 
38, 45 (1st Cir. 2008).  
 219. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (permitting parties to make motions to stay federal court 
litigation or compel arbitration in federal court); id. § 7 (allowing subpoena power in federal court); 
id. §§ 9–11 (providing a federal forum to confirm or vacate an arbitration award); id. § 16 (allowing 
appeals from the federal district courts to the federal appellate courts). 
 220. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 
(1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268–69, 281 (1995); Doctor’s 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684 (1996). 
 221. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011). 
 222. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51 (providing that class arbitration, “to the extent 
that it is manufactured by [common law precedent] rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the 
FAA” and noting the benefits of bilateral arbitration over class arbitration (emphasis added)).  
 223. In a typical consolidated case, multiple parties bring similar claims against a common 
respondent.  
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complex and expensive antitrust,224 employment, or trade secret cases 
(long supported by the Court) be arbitrated? 
At first blush, the definition of arbitration may not appear relevant to 
the preemption inquiry. To the contrary, the Court’s new preemption test 
appears to ask whether the state regulation would have a “disproportionate 
impact” on “arbitration”—whatever that may be.225 In Concepcion, the 
preempted state law impacted only class action arbitration, not arbitration 
in a broader sense.226 The FAA does not cover class issues, and all section 
2 requires is that arbitration agreements are valid contracts.227 The FAA 
contains almost no provisions regarding how arbitrations are run.228 
Presumably, this silence allows arbitrators great flexibility in determining 
how to run their own procedures. Silence also allows states to fill in those 
gaps and regulate the area of arbitration.229 Impact preemption, however, 
invalidates otherwise valid “gap filling” laws to the extent that those laws 
disproportionately impact bilateral arbitration.230 
                                                                                                                     
 224. For many decades now, the Court has specifically ruled that arbitrators are competent to 
handle complex cases, such as antitrust matters. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 632, 634 (1985) (“We decline to indulge the presumption 
that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain 
competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.”).  
 225. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.   
 226. See id. Even the Concepcion Court, however, cannot deny the ability of parties to engage 
in a class procedure if all parties choose to be in a class procedure. See id. at 1752. The Oxford 
Health case demonstrates that parties who contract for class arbitration can still proceed with class 
arbitration. 
 227. The RUAA, which has been adopted in seventeen states and the District of Columbia, 
specifically addresses the ability of parties to consolidate actions into a single action, but it does not 
cover class action procedures. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 10 (2000); Acts: Arbitration Act 
(2000), UNIF. L. COMMISSION, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title
=Arbitration%20Act%20 (detailing the jurisdictions that have adopted the RUAA). 
 228. See Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in 
Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 177 (2002) (“[T]he Court seems to recognize that the 
FAA speaks either ambiguously or not at all, such as post-award judicial review, arbitrators’ 
standards of conduct and arbitral procedures-leaving potential gaps in the Act’s pro-arbitration 
policy.”).  
 229. See id. at 207 (“[S]tate law has the potential to fill in and give meaning to the parties’ 
arbitration agreement and to assuage the continuing hostility toward arbitration.”).   
 230. At a very basic level, the Supreme Court could not say that class arbitration is not 
arbitration. If the Court were to actually make this statement, the practical effect would be that the 
FAA governs bilateral arbitration and no federal law governs class arbitration. If no federal law 
governs class arbitration, then the states would be free to regulate it because there would be no 
conflict with the FAA. Thus, the Court can only imply that class arbitration is not “arbitration” as 
that term was used when Congress drafted the Act in 1925. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 
(“Indeed, class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA in 
1925 . . . .”). To say so outright would actually significantly increase the power of the states by 
allowing them to regulate class arbitration (as well as any other type of arbitration that was not 
strictly bilateral).  
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Second, the Court is using impact preemption to strike down state laws 
that do not conflict with FAA section 2. Notably, the Discover Bank test 
did not invalidate an agreement to arbitrate—it merely invalidated a class 
action waiver.231 The parties would still be required to arbitrate.232 This 
marked the first instance in which the Court preempted a law that did not 
invalidate an arbitration agreement.233 Nothing in section 2 conflicts with 
state laws that regulate arbitration without invalidating an agreement to 
arbitrate. The Court then, while saying it is applying conflict preemption, 
no longer requires a conflict.  
Third, the impact preemption test created in Concepcion invalidated a 
generally applicable contract defense—unconscionability. The savings 
clause of section 2 specifically incorporates state contract law into the 
FAA, but under impact preemption, generally applicable state contract 
defenses that have a “disproportionate impact” on arbitration could still be 
subject to preemption.234 The Court’s extraordinarily narrow reading of the 
savings clause in Concepcion runs contrary to the Court’s general rule and 
also to the ruling of another preemption case decided the same term.235  
The Concepcion Court, in its decision, noted other situations that would 
be subject to the same treatment as unconscionability based on class action 
bans, including unconscionability based on failure “to abide by the Federal 
Rules of Evidence” or disallowing “ultimate disposition by a jury.236 The 
Court, however, left unclear whether those situations constitute arbitration 
or are permissible under section 2. If they are not “arbitration,” then they 
would not be covered by the FAA. If they are not permissible under section 
2, the textual difficulties noted above would come into play.  
                                                                                                                     
 231. Id. at 1746, 1753.   
 232. Although some lower courts would invalidate the entire arbitration agreement on 
unconscionability grounds if it failed the Discover Bank test, see, e.g., Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 
F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010), the Court could easily have taken the Discover Bank test on its 
face and upheld the test, provided that the lower courts still required the parties to arbitrate. See 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).  
 233. Of course, the Court in Mastrobuono would have found that the New York Garrity rule 
regarding punitive damages would have been preempted had that issue been squarely before the 
Court. Thus, the Court’s discussion of that issue is purely dicta.  
 234. See Edward P. Boyle & David N. Cinotti, Beyond Nondiscrimination: AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion and the Further Federalization of U.S. Arbitration Law, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 
L.J. 373, 374 (2012) (“Concepcion increases the federal restraints on state contract law by holding 
that even the application of a generally available contract defense like unconscionability, as 
interpreted by a state’s highest court, can be preempted under the FAA.”); Sandra Zellmer, 
Preemption By Stealth, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1659, 1668 (2009) (providing that “[s]avings clauses 
reflect the congressional desire to preserve the presumption against preemption and, more generally, 
maintain state authority and state remedies” and “[d]espite the cooperative federalism trend seen in 
congressional action during the past three decades, the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions have 
gone in the opposite direction” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
 235. See Meltzer, supra note 38, at 12–13 (comparing Concepcion with Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)). 
 236. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.  
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Taken to its extreme, this narrow reading renders the application of 
state contract law impossible. How can the state regulation specifically 
referenced in the FAA also be preempted? In the 2000 Geier v. American 
Honda Motor Co. decision,237 the Court considered a similar question 
regarding the scope of a savings clause in the area of motor vehicle safety. 
238 The Geier majority opted for a narrow preemptive scope, partly because 
a broad preemptive brush would negate the savings clause.239 The 
Concepcion Court appears to take the opposite approach compared to 
Geier. The majority opinion in Concepcion fails to consider that the 
savings clause would indicate a statutory intent for a narrow preemptive 
reach. Instead, the Court struck a general unconscionability law applying to 
all class waivers—it did not “single out” agreements to arbitrate.240 Taken 
to its logical conclusion, the impact preemption test may reduce the 
savings clause to nothing. 
B.  Impact Preemption Is Contrary to the Purposes and 
Objectives of the FAA 
Impact preemption not only offends the text of the FAA but also the 
purposes and objectives of the statute. While some commentators and 
courts suggest that preemption analysis should begin and end with the text 
of the statute,241 under conflict preemption, the Supreme Court’s own test 
seeks to determine if the state regulation stands as an obstacle to the 
“purposes and objectives” of the federal statute.242 Determining the 
purposes and objectives, then, necessarily requires that courts look beyond 
the text of the statute to figure out why Congress passed the statute in the 
first place and what Congress intended to accomplish.243 
In his recent article, Professor David Horton notes that a shift is 
currently taking place in the Court’s jurisprudence, away from a strict 
reading of the FAA to a broader determination of the statute’s purposes. 
Professor Horton describes this movement as a shift from a purely 
textualist approach to a broader purposivist analysis.244 Under purposivism, 
courts should consider the “general purpose” of a statute by trying to 
                                                                                                                     
 237. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).  
 238. Id. at 865–66, 869 (2000). 
 239. Id. at 867–68. The Geier Court also discussed how the presence of a savings clause is a 
textual indication that Congress intended the statute to have a limited preemptive effect. Ultimately, 
however, the Geier Court found that the state regulation at issue was preempted under general 
conflict preemption principles. Id. at 874. 
 240. Hiro N. Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Antidiscrimination Theory of 
FAA Preemption, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 39, 54 (2012). 
 241. See Meltzer, supra note 38, at 10 (discussing Justice Thomas’s reliance on a pure 
textualist approach to reading statutes for preemptive effect).  
 242. Horton, supra note 2, at 1245, 1248. 
 243. Id. at 1263.  
 244. Id. at 1223. 
42
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/5
2015] IMPACT PREEMPTION 753 
 
determine “how an objectively reasonable congressperson would have 
understood a statute’s ambitions” at the time of the statute’s passing.245 In 
reaching this determination, courts should certainly consider the text, 
legislative history, and legal principles to determine the “spirit” of the 
law.246  
While Professor Horton suggests that the Court engaged in a 
purposivist analysis to justify striking down the Discover Bank rule in 
Concepcion,247 this Article contends that the Court’s decision in that case 
is not even supported by purposivist principles. As noted above,248 the 
historical documents and legislative history surrounding the FAA center on 
two primary purposes. First, the drafters’ primary concern was that 
arbitration agreements should be specifically enforced and not treated as 
unenforceable executory contracts.249 The second purpose and objective of 
the FAA is to make arbitration awards enforceable after the parties have 
gone through the process.250  
The problem with the Concepcion ruling is that impact preemption does 
not serve either of these purposes or objectives. Preempting laws that have 
a “disproportionate impact” is overly broad, as explained in more detail 
above. The purpose of the FAA that most closely supports the Concepcion 
ruling is the idea that agreements to arbitrate should be enforced according 
to their terms. This language, however, comes from section 4 and the Volt 
case, which turned on section 4, not section 2.251 The incredible breadth of 
impact preemption moves preemption analysis well beyond both the text, 
and the purposes and objectives of section 2 of the FAA, the only section 
that applies to the states. Returning to a classic application of conflict 
preemption would put the Court more in line with the purposes and 
objectives of the statute.  
C.  Impact Preemption Is a Results-Oriented Creation 
The Court’s new impact preemption appears to be motivated by 
business—not legal—interests.252 The pro-business rhetoric began in the 
                                                                                                                     
 245. Id. at 1245 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id. at 1254. 
 248. For a discussion on the legislative history of the FAA, see supra Subsection I.B.2. 
 249. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra Subsection I.B.1.b. 
 251. See supra notes 128–38. 
 252. See Kristen M. Blankley, Adding by Subtracting: How Limited Scope Agreements for 
Dispute Resolution Representation Can Increase Access to Attorney Services, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 659, 684 (2013) (“In the last few years, arbitration agreements in the consumer context 
have become under fire for being ‘pro business,’ especially those contracts that limit the consumers’ 
ability to proceed as a class.”); David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s Pro-Defendant 
Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 
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Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp.,253 which was, interestingly, a dispute involving an arms-length 
transaction among business owners, as opposed to a business and a 
consumer.254 In a case turning on arbitrability—the question of who should 
decide whether a dispute should be arbitrated at all—the Court found that 
an arbitration panel erred in proceeding with a class action when the parties 
stipulated that the contract was “silent” on the issue.255 The Court found 
the arbitrators “exceeded their powers” because of the vast differences 
between class and bilateral proceedings.256 It stated that “class-action 
arbitration changes the nature of arbitration” by sacrificing cost and 
efficiency,257 resulting in a procedure involving high stakes for the 
defendant party.258 The Court echoed these themes two years later in 
Concepcion. 
The Court essentially decided Concepcion on business grounds.259 The 
decision specifically weighed business interests more heavily than 
consumer interests: 
[C]lass arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. 
Informal procedures do of course have a cost: The absence of 
multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will go 
uncorrected. Defendants are willing to accept the costs of 
these errors in arbitration, since their impact is limited to the 
size of individual disputes, and presumably outweighed by 
savings from avoiding the courts. But when damages 
allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants are 
aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will often 
become unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of a 
                                                                                                                     
1153, 1158 (2013) (providing an in-depth analysis of the Court’s pro-defendant and pro-business 
bias in Concepcion). 
 253. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).  
 254. See id. at 1764. The Stolt-Nielsen case involves agreements to ship liquids over 
international waters. Id. This case starkly contrasts with a case such as Concepcion, which involves 
a large class of individuals who purchased “free” phones from AT&T. AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).  
 255. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764, 1775 (holding that an arbitrator cannot find an implicit 
agreement to arbitrate as a class). 
 256. See id. at 1767.   
 257. Id. at 1775; see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (“First, the switch from bilateral to 
class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the 
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”); 
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 n.5 (2013) (noting that Concepcion 
all but decides the case on the issue of class action waivers). 
 258. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776. Although the Stolt-Nielsen case involves a 
business–business dispute, the holding has wide application in consumer and employment cases. 
See Bales & Gerano, supra note 111, at 417; Drahozal, Error Correction, supra note 153, at 30, 33.   
 259. See Korn & Rosenberg, supra note 252, at 1152–53 (“Whether intended or not, 
Concepcion’s default rule against class arbitration creates a potent structural and systemic bias in 
favor of defendants.”). 
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devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into settling 
questionable claims.260 
The Court then went on to note that defendants would not be willing to 
engage in “bet the company” claims in arbitration due to the limited nature 
of review.261  
Interestingly, the Court has only become concerned about these types of 
high-stakes and bet-the-company claims in recent years and in the class 
action context. Previously, the Court approved of high-stakes, statutory-
rights cases going to arbitration, including those involving antitrust, RICO, 
securities, and discrimination claims.262 Many of these claims are, or can 
become, bet-the-company cases, and all are arbitrable. In fact, the business 
community was the largest proponent of the arbitrability of these types of 
cases.263 After the business interests convinced the Court that statutory 
claims are arbitrable, “repeat players” began including arbitration 
agreements in all form contracts, including credit card and cellular 
telephone contracts, and employment agreements.264 Some businesses 
became repeat players in arbitration and acquired skill in choosing 
arbitrators, navigating the system, and keeping awards confidential.265 By 
                                                                                                                     
 260. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (emphasis added). The Court does not cite any authority 
for these propositions other than a single circuit opinion given as an example. Id. (citing Kohen v. 
Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2009)). In the class action litigation setting, 
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure noted that when a court grants class 
certification, defendants may feel pressure “to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class 
action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s 
notes; see also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1199–1200 (2013).  
 261. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752. 
 262. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616, 
640 (1985) (holding an arbitration act valid under the Sherman Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (holding that section 14 of the Securities 
Exchange Act did not prohibit arbitration); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 
23 (1991) (holding a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act can be subject to 
compulsory arbitration in a securities registration application).  
 263. For instance, in the area of securities, the SEC historically opposed arbitrating consumer 
claims. In the landmark case Wilko v. Swan, the SEC filed an amicus brief siding with consumers 
who ultimately won their argument that consumer statutory claims should not be arbitrated. See 346 
U.S. 427, 428 n.*, 434–35 (1953). Thirty years later, the SEC switched its position and overturned 
Wilko. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484. 
 264. See Bagenstos, supra note 200, at 67 (“[Arbitration critics] contend that arbitration favors 
employers, who, as repeat players, have an outsized influence on the selection of arbitrators. They 
contend that virtually all of the process that arbitration removes is process that benefits workers.” 
(footnote omitted)); L. Ali Khan, Arbitral Autonomy, 74 LA. L. REV. 1, 50 (2013); Sarah Rudolph 
Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 478 (2011) [hereinafter Cole, Babies and 
Bathwater].  
 265. Khan, supra note 264, at 50. For an overview of empirical evidence in the area of 
consumer arbitrations, see Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer 
Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009). 
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contrast, the consumers, employees, and other “one-shot players” have less 
institutional knowledge of arbitration—a potential disadvantage in the 
process, although empirical data suggests that one-shot players are not 
actually disadvantaged in the arbitral forum.266  
Now that many in the business community have become successful in 
requiring the arbitration of an assortment of disputes with one-shot players, 
business interests have pushed the envelope even further in requiring that 
the arbitration occur individually.267 Many standard contracts now contain 
class action waivers facially applicable in both litigation and arbitration.268 
Since the Concepcion decision, lower courts have largely enforced these 
agreements and required individual arbitration.269 With one exception,270 
the Supreme Court has ruled that class action waivers can be enforced 
according to their terms, and in the four cases involving this issue, business 
interests promoted these arguments.271 
These arbitration opinions appear in line with a recent trend in making 
access to class action procedures more difficult, thus making the 
application of impact theory to preemption particularly troubling.272 For 
                                                                                                                     
 266. See Cole & Blankley, supra note 265, at 1054 n.17, 1056–57. 
 267. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Legal Uncertainty and Aberrant Contracts: The Choice of 
Law Clause, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 197, 201 n.13 (2014) (“The new world of individual arbitration 
as the near-exclusive method of addressing consumer-business disputes that arise from a contract 
has made the problems much worse.”).  
 268. See, e.g., AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, http://www.att.com/shop/
en/legalterms.html?toskey=wirelessCustomerAgreement#arbAgreement (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); 
Chase Liquid Agreement, CHASE 10, https://www.chase.com/content/dam/chasecom/en/debit-
reloadable-cards/documents/chase_liquid_terms_conditions.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) 
(containing explicit class action waivers).   
 269. See, e.g., Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 2013) (reversing 
the lower court’s holding of a class action waiver as unconscionable); Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel 
Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that a class action waiver and arbitration 
clause were enforceable under Concepcion); Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 
221, 232–33, 237 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding the validity of an arbitration agreement that did not 
contain an express class action waiver). 
 270. See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutton, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 (2013) (allowing an 
arbitrator’s decision to stand when the arbitrator read the contract broadly, allowing a class action 
procedure). 
 271. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Nitro-Lift Techs., 
LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011); Bazzle v. Green Tree, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 272. See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013) (finding no 
justiciable claim for class relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act when the named plaintiff’s 
claim becomes moot); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–33 (2013) (finding that 
the district court erred in certifying a class action of two million customers against a large cable 
company in an antitrust claim on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven their 
damages theory at the certification stage); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547, 
2556–57 (2011) (finding that the district court erred in certifying a class of 1.5 million women in 
discrimination lawsuit because there was no commonality). But see Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans 
& Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (upholding class certification in a securities fraud class 
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instance, the Court issued its decisions in Concepcion and Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes273 in the same term, causing some to question the 
future of class procedures in any forum.274 The combination of impact 
preemption with bilateral arbitration essentially insulates businesses from 
liability, especially liability stemming from low dollar claims that are 
inefficient to bring individually.275 The Court’s new jurisprudence appears 
to be results-oriented decision-making that seeks to protect business 
interests, rather than constitutional integrity.276  
D.  Conclusion: Impact Preemption Is Broader than 
Field Preemption 
Impact preemption has the potential to be even broader than field 
preemption. While both types of preemption have some similarities, impact 
preemption, which is supposed to be an application of conflict preemption, 
has some applications considerably broader than even field preemption. 
This Section explores the intersection between impact, field, and conflict 
preemption. 
First, the scope of preemption differs among all three types of 
preemption. Conflict preemption is supposed to involve the narrowest 
                                                                                                                     
action on the grounds that the plaintiff class need not prove the merits of “materiality” in a fraud-
on-the-market claim); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) 
(finding that class action was not moot despite the fact that the defendant offered full refunds as a 
maneuver to avoid class treatment); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 
2183 (2011) (holding that security fraud plaintiffs need not prove loss causation to obtain class 
certification). For more information on the current treatment of class action litigation, see Angela D. 
Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice After Wal-Mart: The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 
87 (2013); Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 
46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1097 (2013). 
 273. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 274. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes 
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 & n.3, 708 (2012) (noting that the future of consumer 
and employment discrimination class actions looked “grim”); Jenna C. Smith, Comment, “Carving 
at the Joints”: Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consume Class Actions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1187, 
1188 (2013) (calling into question the future of class action practice following Dukes). 
 275. One interesting trend in the area of repeat player and one-shot player arbitration has been 
the inclusion of premium payments for those who reject the company’s last offer and then get a 
higher award from the arbitrator. See Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining 
“Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 825, 829 (2012). The inclusion of these premium payments (usually around $7500) should 
incentivize the companies to make a full offer of damages to make the plaintiff whole. See, e.g., id. 
(noting that AT&T’s arbitration agreement provides that the company will pay claimants at least 
$7500 and two times the claimant’s attorney’s fees if the claimant obtains an arbitration award that 
exceeds the company’s last settlement offer). However, the premium payments are still well below 
what a lawyer would charge to represent an individual, either on an hourly fee or a contingency 
basis. 
 276. See, e.g., Zellmer, supra note 234, at 1671 (noting that the preemption decisions in the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have been unprincipled and results-oriented). 
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scope. For example, conflict preemption applies only when it is impossible 
for a person to comply with both the federal and the state regulation at the 
same time.277 Conflict preemption can also apply to a state regulation if the 
“purpose of the act” cannot be accomplished.278 These tests are limited to 
actual conflicts, and the scope is only as large as the actual conflict.279 
Field preemption involves a broader scope of federal power, applying 
when “the matter on which the state asserts the right to act is in any way 
regulated by the federal government.”280 For field preemption to apply, the 
federal government must actually occupy the field through regulation. 
Consistent with federalism concerns, the Supreme Court applies field 
preemption sparingly, usually in highly specialized areas such as alien 
registration,281 locomotive safety,282 and tanker operations and design.283   
Impact preemption is not akin to either of these traditional types of 
preemption. Impact preemption appears to apply whenever state regulation 
disproportionately “impacts” or affects arbitration in “practice.”284 While 
not defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, one ordinary definition of impact is 
very broad, including: “the force of impression of one thing on another.”285 
In other words, all that is required for an impact is some type of force of 
impression on federal arbitration law. Notably, the definition does not 
                                                                                                                     
 277. See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013) (finding it impossible 
for pharmaceutical companies manufacturing generic drugs to obey both a federal law requiring the 
use of one label and a state law requiring the use of a different label at the same time); Gade v. Nat’l 
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion) (noting that conflict 
preemption exists where the concomitant compliance with federal and state regulations is 
impossible).  
 278. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (quoting Savage v. 
Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)). 
 279. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warns that conflict preemption should be narrowly 
applied, and it has created presumptions (like the presumption against preemption) to ensure the 
narrowness of the scope. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1984–85 
(2011) (finding the test for preemption more burdensome when Congress intends to allocate 
“authority between the Federal Government and the States”); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 
U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (“When considering pre-emption, we start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 
(1989) (noting that parties seeking preemption must “overcome the presumption against finding 
pre-emption” in fields in which the states traditionally regulate).  
 280. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
213 (1983) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 236) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 281. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497, 2503 (2012). 
 282. See Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1264 (2012) (regarding the 
Locomotive Inspection Act). 
 283. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 101, 112–14 (2000) (noting the field preemption 
of provisions of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972).  
 284. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011). 
 285. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1131 (Philip Babcock Gove, 3d ed. 
1993).  
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require a conflict—just a force of impression. As noted below, this 
definition would encompass any state regulation of arbitration.286 Impact 
preemption, then, is broader than field preemption because Congress does 
not currently occupy the “field” of arbitration and because the nexus of 
having an impact or an impression on the FAA is broader than any 
preemption principle seen to date. 
Second, the ability of states to fill in the regulatory gaps differs among 
the preemption styles. Under traditional conflict preemption, states are free 
to legislate in any way that does not conflict with federal regulation.287 
Consistent state regulations and gap-filling provisions are, by definition, 
not conflicting; they are, therefore, permissible areas of state regulation. In 
contrast, when field preemption applies, states are unable to regulate 
anything within the boundary of the field, even when the state regulation 
would be consistent or gap-filling.288 Impact preemption also appears to 
limit states’ ability to regulate consistently with the FAA or to fill in the 
many gaps in the FAA’s coverage of arbitration regulation. Under 
Concepcion, any state law that has a “disproportionate impact” on 
arbitration is subject to preemption without regard to a conflict in the 
statutes.289  
The Court’s new test simply cannot be called an application of conflict 
preemption. Nor can it be called an extension of conflict preemption. None 
of the hallmarks of conflict preemption can be found in the new impact-
preemption test. Taking the Court’s test to its logical conclusions also 
demonstrates that impact preemption is broader than field preemption. In 
the arbitration context, field preemption would be completely unwarranted, 
and the Court’s new test can only be a product of results-based decision-
making.  
IV.  IMPACT PREEMPTION’S POLICY REPERCUSSIONS 
Impact preemption has broad policy flaws. Chief among these flaws are 
implications for federalism, freedom to contract, separation of powers, and 
the Court’s power to create law, as opposed to simple interpretation of the 
law. This Part considers how impact preemption implicates these important 
policies.  
A.  Federalism Concerns 
Impact preemption offends basic notions of federalism. As noted above, 
preemption principles are founded on a careful balance of powers between 
the federal and state governments. Over the course of the last four decades, 
                                                                                                                     
 286. See infra Section IV.A. 
 287. See Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013) (holding that state law 
is only preempted when a direct conflict exists between the state and federal law). 
 288. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.  
 289. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  
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the Court has increasingly taken power away from the states in an 
unprincipled line of decisions, ultimately creating impact preemption and 
severely limiting state regulation under the Supremacy Clause.290 
The rightful place of state arbitration regulation prior to Concepcion 
was unclear due to the Supreme Court’s failure to engage in a preemption 
analysis. In a post-Concepcion world, the states’ role is even less clear. A 
few examples help illustrate this point. For instance, a number of states, 
including Kentucky, have a relatively straightforward law stating: “A party 
has the right to be represented by an attorney at any [arbitration] . . . . A 
waiver thereof prior to the proceeding or hearing is ineffective.”291 A 
statute like this, allowing for lawyer representation, helps ensure that 
parties can be adequately represented in arbitration, and Kentucky normally 
would be able to legislate in this manner to protect citizens under the 
general police power. The FAA is silent on the issue of the right to 
representation, so under traditional conflict analysis, this statute would not 
directly conflict with the FAA. On the other hand, legal representation 
certainly has an “impact” on arbitration. Adding lawyers to the arbitration 
process might make arbitration costlier, less efficient, and more complex. 
One might assume that this type of law would not be preempted, but the 
Court’s impact preemption analysis suggests that states cannot regulate in 
this way.  
Other state statutes contain measures to provide even greater protection 
for citizens, especially consumers. Consider a Montana statute stating that 
“[a]n agreement concerning venue involving a resident of [Montana] is not 
valid unless the agreement requires that arbitration occur within the state of 
Montana.”292 This statute seeks to protect the citizens of Montana by 
allowing them to arbitrate on their “home turf.” The statute does not 
invalidate any agreements to arbitrate and would only strike a contrary 
forum-selection clause.293 Again, there is no direct conflict with the FAA 
because the FAA does not contain any provisions regarding forum. This 
statute, however, has an “impact” on arbitrations with Montana residents 
                                                                                                                     
 290. See Cole, Federalization of Consumer Arbitration, supra note 11, at 276–77 (“The 
Supreme Court’s anti-federalism approach to arbitration precludes states from engaging in the kind 
of democratic experimentation with different regulatory approaches that federalism typically 
encourages and that, generally, results in well-considered solutions to existing problems.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 291. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.100 (West 2014). 
 292. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (West 2014) (allowing parties to waive this provision and 
arbitrate outside of the state if they so agree after receiving advice of counsel).  
 293. Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Mont. 1998). The Montana 
Supreme Court held that this provision did not conflict with the FAA and was, therefore, good law. 
Id.  
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by dictating where they must take place and it may very well be preempted 
the next time its validity is litigated.294 
Some states’ regulations now allow for multi-party arbitrations that fall 
short of a class action. For instance, Florida passed a statute allowing a 
court to consolidate “separate arbitration proceedings” into one 
proceeding.295 As noted above, the FAA says absolutely nothing about 
consolidated actions; however, this type of law has an “impact” on 
arbitration. In fact, the impact that consolidation has on arbitration 
threatens the very definition of bilateral arbitration now espoused by the 
Court. Following Concepcion, strong arguments now exist that all 
consolidation statutes are preempted.  
As these examples show, areas of arbitration law traditionally regulated 
by the states are now potentially subject to preemption due to the Court’s 
overreaching. Preemption doctrines historically sought to preserve the 
balance between state and federal regulatory authority with a healthy 
regard for state authority in areas, like arbitration, traditionally regulated by 
the states.296 Under a system of true conflict preemption analysis, the states 
should be allowed to regulate areas such as judicial review, availability of 
representation, class actions, discovery provisions, arbitrator selection, 
                                                                                                                     
 294. As an aside, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Montana Supreme Court have not always 
ruled consistently on these arbitration preemption issues. The Casarotto case discussed supra also 
involved a protectionist Montana statute, but arguably an important difference exists between the 
“first page” rule and the venue rule embodied in these statutes. Under the “first page” rule, 
arbitration agreements are unenforceable if the arbitration clause does not appear on the first page 
of the contract. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 571 U.S. 681, 684 (1996). Under the venue 
rule, a contrary venue provision is struck from the agreement and the dispute is subject to 
arbitration in the state of Montana. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-323.  
 295. FL. STAT. ANN. § 682.033 (2014). The Florida statute would require that the court make 
the following findings: 
(a) There are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbitration proceedings 
between the same persons or one of them is a party to a separate agreement to 
arbitrate or a separate arbitration proceeding with a third person; 
(b) The claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate arise in substantial part from 
the same transaction or series of related transactions; 
(c) The existence of a common issue of law or fact creates the possibility of 
conflicting decisions in the separate arbitration proceedings; and 
(d) Prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not outweighed by the risk 
of undue delay or prejudice to the rights of or hardship to parties opposing 
consolidation. 
Id. Because all parties are present, a consolidation is different than a class action. 
 296. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 133 
(2004); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country.”). 
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ethics, and other issues that are neither addressed in the FAA nor 
specifically regulated by federal courts.  
In addition to curtailing the ability of states to regulate arbitration 
specifically, impact preemption potentially limits incorporation of state law 
into the FAA through the savings clause.297 Because the savings clause 
requires courts to apply state contract law to determine the validity of 
agreements to arbitrate, the balance between federal and state regulation 
should weigh in favor of state authority.298 To the contrary, impact 
preemption might render the savings clause meaningless because general 
contract law has an “impact” on arbitration. Notably, unconscionability law 
has a large “impact” on arbitration, and the vast majority of successful 
unconscionability challenges to contracts occur in the arbitration setting.299 
If unconscionability is more successful in invaliding arbitration agreements 
than contracts as a whole, then it would seemingly fail the impact 
preemption test. A logical extension of the impact preemption doctrine 
would jeopardize other facially-neutral contract defenses, including fraud 
and duress.300 
In the Concepcion dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer expressed deep 
concerns about federalism in arbitration regulation. He stated:  
[Under the savings clause,] Congress retained for the States 
an important role incident to agreements to arbitrate 
. . . . Congress reiterated a basic federal idea that has long 
                                                                                                                     
 297. See Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2013) (“After 
analyzing both Concepcion and subsequent cases, we conclude that Concepcion further limited the 
FAA's savings clause . . . .”); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (making agreements to arbitrate enforceable “save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).  
 298. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981 (2011) (relying on the 
savings clause to find part of Arizona’s licensing law not preempted stating: “Congress chose to 
leave [certain parts of the regulation] to the States and therefore [Arizona’s law] is not expressly 
preempted”); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 612–13 (1991) (noting that 
preemption is less likely to be found in situations in which the statute specifically gives a portion of 
the regulation to the states). 
 299. See Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury is Out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Agreements 
for Medical Malpractice Claims: Law, Ethics, and Prudence, 28 J. LEG. MED. 333, 357–58 (2007) 
(noting that “[a]lthough claims of unconscionability are ordinarily difficult to sustain, courts will 
void arbitration agreements in select circumstances.”); Sternlight, supra note 274, at 707 (“While 
Concepcion will have less impact in those jurisdictions that had already permitted companies to use 
arbitration to insulate themselves against class actions, the analysis that follows shows that 
Concepcion is having a significant impact in those jurisdictions that previously allowed 
unconscionability attacks against arbitral class action waivers.” (footnote omitted)); Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 219 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014).  
 300. Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption After Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 153, 164 n.64 (2014). The Concepcion decision involved an application of 
unconscionability law; the California Discover Bank test was a specific application of 
unconscionability in the area of class action waivers. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740, 1746–47 (2011). Open questions may exist regarding whether unconscionability 
generally may be used as a defense to the validity of an arbitration agreement. 
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informed the nature of this Nation’s laws . . . . But federalism 
is as much a question of deeds as words. It often takes the 
form of a concrete decision by this Court that respects the 
legitimacy of a State’s action in an individual case. Here, 
recognition of that federalist ideal, embodied in specific 
language in this particular statute, should lead us to uphold 
California’s law, not to strike it down. We do not honor 
federalist principles in their breach.301 
Justice Breyer recognized—though not explicitly—the lack of clarity in 
the area of FAA preemption. Without additional, clear expression of the 
scope of preemption under the FAA, impact preemption will likely 
continue to eviscerate the states’ role in arbitration.302  
Without any guidance in the area of FAA preemption, the Court now 
has license to preempt any state law dealing with arbitration. The Court 
needs to step back and consider more seriously the type of preemption it 
intends to apply and then create careful rules to balance the textual 
limitations within the FAA, the purposes and objectives of the Act, and the 
proper role for the states. When the Court undertakes this task, it should 
conclude that limited conflict preemption should apply to the FAA, with 
the conflicts limited to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and, 
potentially, arbitral awards.  
B.  Freedom to Contract Concerns 
The Supreme Court’s recent impact preemption decisions have not only 
affected the ability of states to regulate arbitration but also parties’ abilities 
to contract for a procedure that best suits their needs—even in arms-length 
transactions. While it now sounds cliché, the Court previously understood 
that “[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to 
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered,”303 and to 
                                                                                                                     
 301. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 302. In addition, the Supreme Court has been very quick to act in this area, which is contrary 
to federalism practice. Usually, the Court likes to give the states time to digest their decisions, 
experiment in their own jurisdictions, and otherwise struggle to determine how to best regulate an 
area within their own borders. In the area of arbitration, however, the Court has been extraordinarily 
quick to interfere. For instance, the Court granted certiorari in Concepcion less than two years 
following the issuance of the Discover Bank rule. See id. at 1745. The Court was even quicker to act 
in the Marmet Health case. In that case, the Court granted certiorari on the very first case that the 
West Virginia Supreme Court decided on the issue of the public policy surrounding arbitration 
clauses in the field of nursing home contracts. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. 
Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (per curiam). The Court clearly wanted to jump in as soon as possible, rather 
than allow the states room to experiment and give them the opportunity to find out how to best 
regulate within their own borders. 
 303. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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overcome the “judicial hostility” towards arbitration agreements present at 
the turn of the twentieth century.304  
If the FAA preserves the parties’ right to contract for arbitration, then 
parties should have the ability to be creative and utilize the arbitration 
procedure in the way that best meets their needs.305 Unlike the standard 
judicial procedures available, parties in arbitration should have the ability 
to determine, for example: who will be the decision maker, how many 
decision makers will be involved, whether to tailor discovery rules, 
whether a live hearing will occur, the location of the hearing, the language 
of the hearing, applicable time limitations on presentations, applicable 
rules of evidence, applicable substantive law,306 applicable time limitations 
on arbitrators to issue awards, and the availability of temporary or 
injunctive relief and class remedies, among countless other options. Parties 
choose arbitration, in part, to take advantage of these types of procedural 
informalities and to custom design a process to best meet the needs of all 
of the participants.307  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have eroded this 
freedom of contract. Impact preemption jeopardizes the parties’ established 
right to arbitrate “according to [the terms] of private agreements” as well 
as the previously established norm that “no federal policy favor[s] 
arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules.”308 The erosion of the 
policies set forth in Volt goes far beyond the confusion the Court created 
                                                                                                                     
 304. Id. These policies are firmly rooted in the text of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) 
(making agreements to arbitrate “enforceable”); 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (requiring federal courts to 
compel arbitration “in the manner provided for in [the parties’] agreement”); see also James Savage, 
The Majority Approach to Arbitration Waiver: A Workable Test or a License for Litigants to Play 
Games with the Courts?, 11 U. N.H. L. REV. 217, 217 (2013) (“The freedom of parties to agree to 
arbitrate their disputes is enshrined by contract law and federal law.”). 
 305. Of course, the options are not limitless and must be reined in with contract principles such 
as unconscionability. Provided that the procedures are lawful and conscionable, then the parties 
should be able to agree to resolve their disputes in a way that best makes sense for them. 
 306. As a general matter, parties have the ability to determine the substantive law that will 
govern their dispute and to choose the law that governs the arbitration proceedings. Kaleena 
Scamman, ADR in the Music Industry: Tailoring Dispute Resolution to the Different Stages of the 
Artist–Label Relationship, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 269, 289 (2008). Under Volt, the Court 
discussed how a choice-of-law clause is an extension of the parties’ general right to contract. See 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478–79 (1988). 
While Volt continues to be cited as good law, the Court seems to be slowly taking away the power 
of parties to contract for their own dispute resolution procedure.  
 307. See Stanley Sklar, Arbitration Advocacy: Its Role in Business and Legal Education, and 
New Options for Dispute Resolution, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 441, 452 (2013) (“There is no 
greater flexibility than in arbitration. It is far more flexible than the court process.”); Neal M. 
Eiseman et al., A Tale of Two Lawyers: How Arbitrators and Advocates Can Avoid the Dangerous 
Convergence of Arbitration and Litigation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 683, 701 (2013) (“The 
perceived benefits of arbitration, including flexibility, speed, and relative affordability, should be 
safeguarded at the pre-hearing conference.”). 
 308. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added). 
54
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/5
2015] IMPACT PREEMPTION 765 
 
when it ruled in Mastrobouno that certain choice-of-law clauses are not 
enforceable.309 Now, impact preemption may interfere with the parties’ 
ability to contract around the FAA. Although the Concepcion majority 
recognizes the parties’ freedom of contract and their ability to choose their 
own rules, this negative language leaves questions about what the Court 
would do in a situation involving parties who are truly willing to have a 
class arbitration. 
The first real blow to the ability of parties to contract for their own 
arbitration procedures—outside of the Mastrobuono case—came in 2008 
with the Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.310 In Hall 
Street, the Court expressly held that parties could not contract for greater 
judicial review than that provided in the FAA.311 The Court suggested that 
a party could gain this type of greater judicial review through state 
courts,312 but there are still open questions about whether state law 
providing for review more extensive than the FAA would be preempted.313 
If the state law would be preempted, the Court would likely hesitate to 
allow parties to contract for more searching review through a choice-of-law 
provision.314 The Court’s current impact preemption decisions, then, affect 
how parties can draft their agreements to arbitrate. If parties cannot 
incorporate the state law of their choosing because the law was otherwise 
preempted, then the Court’s decisions on preemption regulate not only the 
states but also private parties and their ability to draft their own arbitration 
agreements. 
                                                                                                                     
 309. The Mastrobouno case appears at odds with Volt in addressing the limits of parties’ 
abilities to contract for their own arbitration procedures. Compare Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1995) (holding that a choice-of-law provision 
incorporated only the specified state’s substantive law, not its procedures for arbitration), with Volt, 
489 U.S. at 476 (holding that “[i]nterpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable state rules 
governing the conduct of arbitration” does not contradict the FAA).  
 310. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 311. See id. at 578.  
 312. See id. at 590.  
 313. Coincidentally, an open question still exists as to whether parties can contract for less 
review than is available under the FAA. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices 
Litig., 737 F.3d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that an arbitration agreement that “eliminates 
judicial review” under the FAA is “unenforceable”); Baylor Health Care Sys. v. Equitable Plan 
Servs., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 678, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (distinguishing the Texas Arbitration Act, 
which would allow for expanded or limited review, from the FAA, which does not allow for such 
contractual modifications); Smith v. AHS Okla. Heart, LLC, No. 11-CV-691-TCK-FHM, 2012 WL 
3156877, at *3–4 (N.D. Okla., Aug. 3, 2012) (finding a fee shifting provision in an arbitration 
agreement unenforceable, in part, because of a limitation on judicial review). 
 314. Previously, under Volt, parties could contract to be bound by laws that would otherwise 
be preempted by the FAA, thus giving life to preempted state statutes. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472–73 (1988). Since Mastrobuono, the law 
regarding choice-of-law remains muddy on the extent to which parties can contract around the FAA 
using state law.  
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The FAA should be read as default rules giving parties contractual 
freedom.315 However, the impact preemption cases—Concepcion and 
beyond—have gone to great lengths to describe a “classic” type of 
arbitration that forms the statutory standard of arbitration regulation. In 
other words, the Court has explicitly stated that arbitration must be 
informal, cost-efficient, and quick in order to meet the purposes of the 
FAA.316 The Court held that class arbitration does not meet these standards 
because it is “slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural 
morass,” and because it creates open questions regarding the protections of 
unnamed class members, confidentiality, and the high stakes involved in 
class arbitration.317 At this point, it is unclear how the Court would treat an 
agreement permitting class actions under these or different terms.  
The Court’s harsh language raises the question—can parties choose to 
have a dispute resolution procedure that does not meet the “classic” 
definition of bilateral arbitration? In 2013, the Court appeared to answer 
that question in the affirmative in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,318 
when an arbitrator found that the language of the contract allowed for class 
procedures.319 But the Italian Colors opinion, issued mere months later 
with its strong language against class procedures,320 has raised questions as 
to Oxford Health’s broader application.  
The Court’s recent decisions (Oxford Health aside) cast serious doubts 
as to whether parties can, for instance, specifically allow class procedures, 
contract for state law allowing greater judicial review, or design other types 
of arbitration processes. Nothing in the text of the FAA would prohibit any 
of these variations on dispute resolution. Thus, the Court’s recent rulings 
ultimately impede the parties’ freedom to contract—freedom central to 
Congress’s and the states’ rationale for adopting arbitration acts in the first 
place. If the Court engaged in a principled preemption analysis and 
narrowly construed FAA preemption, contract drafters would be freer to 
contract for any type of arbitration, including complex class procedures. 
                                                                                                                     
 315. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1103, 1138 (2011) (“But the FAA has few clearly identifiable default rules, largely a 
consequence of its 1925 vintage. And state arbitration laws raise difficult and unsettled issues of 
FAA preemption, which may limit their usefulness as gap-fillers, and are themselves incomplete.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 316. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011); see also Cole, 
Federalization of Consumer Arbitration, supra note 11, at 288–89 (defining the “essential nature” 
of arbitration to include “confidentiality of the proceedings, all parties present, knowledgeable 
arbitrators, lower costs, speed, efficiency, limited judicial review, and limited ‘procedural vigor’”) 
(quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751). 
 317. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51; see also Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 
(2013). 
 318. 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).  
 319. Id. at 2066.  
 320. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312.   
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While the Court has routinely enforced the ability of parties to arbitrate, it 
must now be willing to allow the parties to contract for any type of 
arbitration that they would like, including class claims. 
C.  Other Contractual Concerns 
The Supreme Court has long described the FAA as an 
antidiscrimination statute intended to put arbitration clauses on “equal 
footing” with every other type of contract.321 The Court’s impact 
preemption decisions, however, have placed arbitration on a pedestal and 
have treated agreements to arbitrate differently than all other contracts.  
Although the Court continues to state that agreements to arbitrate 
should be treated the same as any other contract,322 the Court’s impact 
preemption decisions now treat arbitration—especially bilateral 
arbitration—with a certain reverence not supported by any law, much less 
the FAA. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissenting opinion in Concepcion, 
prior arbitration precedent was never concerned with the merits of class 
actions, only with the “equal treatment of arbitration contracts and other 
contracts. Since [that question] is at issue here, I am not surprised that the 
majority can find no meaningful precedent supporting its decision.”323 The 
Court has increasingly shown a preference for arbitration agreements over 
other types of contracts, enforcing agreements to arbitrate in a bilateral 
manner whether or not the parties appear to have contracted for such 
arbitration. 
If the Court wants to treat agreements to arbitrate in the same manner as 
any other contract, the Court should temper its preemption doctrine 
decisions and uphold state laws that try to regulate contract issues. But the 
Court appears to favor arbitration agreements, restricting the states’ ability 
to regulate general contract law within their borders if arbitration 
agreements happen to be affected by that law. The Court, then, is not 
putting arbitration “on equal footing” with other contracts, but is instead 
giving it a higher status that Congress never intended.  
V.  PROPOSAL: A RETURN TO CONFLICT PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES 
Given the ad hoc manner in which the Court has been proceeding in the 
area of arbitration preemption for the last forty (or more) years, it must go 
back to basics and conduct a traditional preemption analysis. When the 
Court engages in this type of analysis, it will have to conclude that 
                                                                                                                     
 321. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996) (citing Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)); see also Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777–78 (2010); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 
581 (2008). 
 322. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 64 (2009); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006).  
 323. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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traditional conflict preemption applies to the FAA and that the impact 
preemption test it created in Concepcion is significantly broader than any 
other conflict preemption test. After abandoning the impact preemption 
test, the Court should return to the principles and objectives of the FAA, 
and should consider the traditional limitations on preemption in areas, such 
as arbitration, that have historically been regulated by the states. Finally, 
given the congressional deadlock on the issue of arbitration over the past 
decade or two, the Supreme Court stands in the best position to engage in 
this type of change, even if such a change means that the Court will have to 
overrule its decision in Concepcion. 
A.  The Supreme Court Must Engage in a Preemption Analysis 
First and foremost, the Court needs to engage in a formal and principled 
preemption analysis for the FAA. The Court simply cannot continue its 
arbitration jurisprudence without undertaking this fundamental task. The 
Court is in an untenable situation precisely because it has not previously 
engaged in this exercise.324 The remedy is to engage in this analysis and 
establish the rules and parameters of arbitration preemption. 
When the Court engages in this analysis, it will have to again conclude 
that conflict preemption applies to the FAA. As detailed above more 
fully,325 conflict preemption is the only type of preemption that could apply 
to the FAA. Based on the text of the FAA, express preemption cannot 
apply.326 In addition, the limited nature of the FAA and the lack of 
regulatory oversight makes traditional field preemption analysis 
inappropriate.327 Although some scholars describe the FAA as 
“comprehensive,”328 they use this term simply to mean that the courts have 
the power to specifically enforce arbitration agreements as well as the 
ability to enforce arbitration awards329—not as an indication of the 
appropriate type of preemption. The term “comprehensive” could also 
mean that this task is all that the states traditionally needed to do, and that 
the alleged gaps would be filled by contract terms. 
Arbitration scholars would not classify the FAA as “comprehensive” 
for preemption purposes because states have always played a critical role in 
arbitration regulation and because the FAA leaves significant gaps that 
state regulation could fill.330 Thus, conflict preemption is the only type of 
preemption available to the Court.  
                                                                                                                     
 324. See supra Section IV.A. 
 325. See supra Subsection I.B.4. 
 326. See supra Subsection I.B.4. 
 327. See supra Section III.D. 
 328. See supra note 34. 
 329. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 330. Of course, the terms can also be filled in by the parties in their agreement to arbitrate. 
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In addition to being the jurisprudentially correct thing to do, clearly 
defining the role of preemption will significantly benefit the other 
stakeholders in play. Lower courts, for instance, are currently at a loss 
regarding how to treat arbitration preemption issues. Since Concepcion, the 
lower federal courts have issued a myriad of conflicting decisions 
concerning the ability of states to regulate issues such as class actions, 
unconscionability, and other important issues.331 Having clear boundaries 
on preemption would greatly aid the lower courts in applying a consistent, 
nation-wide rule.  
Moreover, clear preemption boundaries would greatly aid states in 
understanding the limitations on their regulatory authority. Currently, states 
are essentially passing legislation without a clear view of the regulations’ 
validity. Impact preemption has the real potential to displace all state 
regulation (statutory and common law) that has any type of influence on 
arbitration, whether such influence is consistent with the FAA or even 
covered by the FAA. States would be greatly aided if they understood the 
contours of FAA preemption and could better regulate within the scope of 
their authority. 
Finally, clear preemption boundaries would give contracting parties a 
better idea of how arbitration agreements will be enforced as well as the 
scope of appropriate contract terms. Simultaneous with the creation of 
impact preemption, the Court has also made some statements suggesting 
that “arbitration” is defined as bilateral arbitration to the exclusion of class 
proceedings and other types of complex proceedings. Clarifying the limits 
of federal power over arbitration would greatly influence how parties craft 
their arbitration agreements. 
In sum, having a principled discussion of the limits of conflict 
preemption as it applies to the FAA will have many positive benefits. This 
type of ruling will bring arbitration preemption in line with preemption 
jurisprudence generally. It will also greatly aid lower courts, state 
governments, and contracting parties—the primary stakeholders—in 
governing their behavior in the area of arbitration. 
B.  A Return to Conflict Preemption 
Having articulated that conflict preemption should apply to the FAA, 
the next question concerns the boundaries of this preemption. Preemption 
in this context should be limited to account for the dual role of federal and 
state regulation. It should also be limited to the purposes and objectives of 
the FAA under the established test for conflict preemption. 
As noted above, based on the text, legislative history, and legal history, 
the FAA has two purposes and objectives.332 The first is to enforce 
                                                                                                                     
 331. See supra note 269. 
 332. See supra Section I.B. 
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agreements to arbitrate. The second is to make arbitral awards enforceable 
as court judgments. Of these two purposes and objectives, only the prior 
can have preemptive effect because of textual limitations in the FAA. 
Thus, FAA section 2 should be the only portion of the FAA with 
preemptive effect.333 All of the other provisions of the FAA have explicit 
jurisdictional language making them only applicable in the federal 
courts.334  
In addition, federalism dictates that the states should be able to regulate 
issues not covered in the FAA. The list of things not covered is 
tremendous—and nothing in the FAA suggests that the states cannot 
legislate in these areas. Items not covered by the FAA include: regulations 
on discovery in arbitration, arbitrator qualifications, arbitrator regulation 
and malpractice, evidentiary burdens in arbitration, statutes of limitations 
for arbitration, evidentiary standards, notice requirements, consolidation 
procedures, class action procedures, and appellate arbitration proceedings, 
just to name a few. Because the federal act does not address any of these 
matters—or many others—the states should feel free to regulate them if 
they choose. The Kentucky, Montana, and Florida statutes all mentioned 
above335 fall into these broad categories of arbitration regulation not 
covered by the FAA. These and other statutes should all be valid exercises 
of state authority. 
If section 2 of the FAA is the only section that would apply to the 
states, then the preemptive effect should be limited to state regulation that 
seeks to invalidate agreements to arbitrate on grounds other than general 
contract grounds. In other words, this Article suggests that the Court was 
correct in its Casarotto ruling, but it should return to this type of 
preemption only after engaging in a principled preemption analysis.  
Following a traditional conflict preemption rule, only state regulations 
that invalidate arbitration agreements in particular should be preempted. 
The types of statutes, regulations, and case law that would be subject to 
preemption would include any regulation invalidating an arbitration 
agreement for improper use of font, clause placement, “magic words,” 
underlining, etc., similar to the rule struck down in Casarotto.336  
The FAA would also preempt—either by statute or by common law—
efforts to invalidate arbitration agreements in certain contexts. Such 
circumstances might include employment contracts, consumer contracts, 
industry-specific contexts (like health care or debt collection), failure to 
                                                                                                                     
 333. As noted above, see supra notes 35, 38–39, the FAA is a unique piece of legislation in 
that it has the substantive power to preempt state regulation but it does not establish independent 
subject matter jurisdiction for the courts. 
 334. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4, 6, 9–11 (2012). 
 335. See supra Section IV.A. 
 336. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (invalidating a Montana 
law requiring that an arbitration agreement be found on the first page of a contract). 
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include a class action option (if such failure is specific only to arbitration), 
and other contexts where agreements to arbitrate would be treated 
differently than that of any other type of contract. This rule is displayed in 
the Marmet Health Care case, in which the Court preempted a West 
Virginia Supreme Court policy that invalidated all arbitration agreements 
simply because the contract covered patient/provider disputes in the 
nursing home industry.337 
This preemption rule should be narrowly limited to efforts by states to 
invalidate agreements to arbitrate on grounds applying solely to arbitration. 
State laws regulating arbitration that stop short of invaliding agreements to 
arbitrate would still be valid. For instance, the California Discover Bank 
test would not be preempted under a traditional conflict preemption 
analysis. Under the Discover Bank test, if the test is satisfied and the class 
action waiver is found to be unconscionable, then the result would be that 
the parties would still have to arbitrate, but the arbitration procedure could 
potentially involve a class action. Similarly, states could take it upon 
themselves to regulate nearly every aspect of arbitration provided that they 
do not invalidate agreements to arbitrate on grounds special to arbitration.  
This reading of preemption is consistent with the text of the FAA as a 
whole, as well as the purposes and objectives Congress sought to enforce 
with this Act. This reading also promotes federalism and the dual system 
of regulation of arbitration envisioned by Congress in 1925 when it passed 
the FAA.  
C.  The Supreme Court Must Be the Agent of Change 
The Supreme Court must be the agent of change, bringing the law of 
arbitration preemption back to where it meets its original intent and 
preserving the balance of power between the federal and state 
governments. While many scholars over the years (myself included) have 
called for congressional action in the area of federal arbitration 
regulation,338 Congress’s inability to pass any type of arbitration legislation 
in more than ninety years demonstrates the sheer improbability that 
Congress could undertake such a task.339 Although numerous changes to 
                                                                                                                     
 337. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (reversing an 
invalidation of contracts as against public policy because they covered disputes in the nursing home 
industry). 
 338. See, e.g., Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
1309, 1337, 1348–54; Kristen M. Blankley, Class Actions Behind Closed Door? How Consumer 
Claims Can (And Should) Be Resolved by Class-Action Arbitration, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
451, 464, 483–85 (2005). 
 339. The most recent amendment to the FAA came in 1988 when Congress added certain 
procedural measures, such as taking appeals from lower court decisions. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). In 
addition, at least one scholar argues that “Congress lacks the time and capacity to consider, and 
reconsider, the scope of preemption as regulatory schemes evolve over time.” Meltzer, supra note 
38, at 18. 
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the FAA have been introduced in Congress, none of these bills have ever 
moved on beyond the committee stage.340 Perhaps Congress’s failure is the 
result of requests for sweeping changes to the FAA (such as invalidating 
all employment, consumer, franchise, and “civil rights” actions),341 as 
opposed to requests for a more nuanced approach to arbitration regulation 
that many scholars have previously suggested.342 Congressional action on 
the preemption issue is simply unfeasible and not the best route for action. 
Critics might contend that this recommendation is counterintuitive 
because the Supreme Court created the impact preemption test. How could 
the Court possibly remedy this situation? The Concepcion and AmEx 
decisions deeply divided the court, resulting in 5–4 and 5–3 (plus one 
abstention) decisions. If the composition of the Court were to change or if 
the right case were to come along, the Court might be able to change its 
course. Recent history suggests this possibility. For instance, the Casarotto 
decision involved an 8–1 decision, with Justice Thomas dissenting on the 
ground that the FAA should have no preemptive power.343 This Article 
suggests returning to the outcome of Casarotto while engaging in a 
thoughtful and analytical analysis of the bounds of conflict preemption for 
FAA section 2. 
In addition, the conclusions called for in this Article are consistent with 
the FAA as it is written. It is only the enforcement of FAA preemption that 
has become an issue. With no legislative modifications needed, the Court 
is the appropriate agent of change. Although the impact preemption 
decisions have gone astray of the FAA, they have not gone so far astray 
that the Supreme Court could not fix its own problem. Simply returning 
back to the roots of the FAA—the text, the legislative history, purposes 
and objectives, and the policy underlying the legislation—as well as the 
roots of preemption, including preserving the balance of power between 
the federal and state governments and limiting intrusion on the power of 
the states, would right the ship and restore the rightful place of arbitration 
regulation.  
                                                                                                                     
 340. See, e.g., Cole, Babies and Bathwater, supra note 264, at 458 & n.1 (discussing repeated 
attempts to introduce the Arbitration Fairness Act). Congress has been able to adopt some reforms 
to arbitration, but only in industry-specific contexts. For example, the Dodd–Frank Act prohibits the 
use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in connection with residential mortgages and home equity 
loans. 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012). Following Concepcion, Al Franken introduced a bill that 
would invalidate all pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the context of consumer wireless phone 
contracts, but that bill did not advance. Roxanne Palmer, Sens. Float Phone Contract Bill to 
Counter Concepcion, LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2011, 9:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/276040/ 
sens-float-phone-contract-bill-to-counter-concepcion. 
 341. See Cole, Babies and Bathwater, supra note 264, at 458 n.1, 459 n.4, 460 n.5. 
 342. See Burch, supra note 338, at 1310–11. 
 343. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Ironically, Justice Thomas was the fifth vote in Concepcion, which created the vast impact 
preemption doctrine. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the problem defined in this Article may have far-reaching 
consequences, the ability to fix this problem is well within the reach of the 
Supreme Court. The Court’s current jurisprudence expanding the scope of 
arbitration and turning conflict preemption into field preemption goes well 
beyond the bounds of preemption law, causing long-term problems for 
lower federal courts, state governments, and contracting parties. 
Recommending that the Court take a serious look at arbitration preemption 
is a small and relatively easy solution to this problem. In taking that 
jurisprudential look at the FAA, the Court should consider its established 
preemption analysis and apply that analysis in a reasoned manner to the 
FAA. In doing so, the Court would reset the balance between state and 
federal regulation in a principled manner, honor congressional intentions to 
create a dual federal–state system of regulation, and support the principles 
of freedom of contract for private parties. 
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